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THE SEC AND FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS: 
A PATH TO OPTIMAL PUBLIC 
ENFORCEMENT 
YULIYA GUSEVA* 
Abstract: This Article examines SEC enforcement policies and seeks to find 
the optimum approach to enforcement against foreign private issuers. My pre-
vious empirical study of securities class actions against foreign firms identi-
fied a number of crucial developments that mainly occurred after Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank. In Morrison, the Supreme Court sought to limit the 
extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws. 
The Court has scaled down the exposure of foreign issuers to securities liabil-
ity risk, particularly in class-action litigation. If the Supreme Court in Morri-
son has created a risky enforcement lacuna on the side of private class actions 
against foreign corporations, how should the SEC adjust its enforcement strat-
egy? To answer this question, this Article presents an empirical survey of SEC 
enforcement actions against foreign issuers between 2005 and 2016. The re-
sults suggest that the SEC consistently pursues a lenient enforcement ap-
proach in this area. This low-key policy is the Commission’s dominant strate-
gy. The Article also discusses post-Morrison doctrinal developments, market 
trends, and red flags potentially indicative of an increased risk of fraud. Alt-
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hough the traditional low-key enforcement policy may attract some foreign 
“lemons” in the post-Morrison environment, the SEC should not depart from 
its dominant strategy and engage in more enforcement actions. Instead, the 
warning signs identified in this paper call for better preventive monitoring. 
The Article suggests a number of low-cost fraud prevention policies, including 
promoting cooperation with foreign firms, using new data analysis programs, 
and galvanizing market “gatekeepers.” Through implementing the mecha-
nisms suggested in this Article, the SEC may reach a more efficient level of 
deterrence without ramping up enforcement and increasing the costs of for-
eign firms seeking to access American capital markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
As capital markets grow progressively more international, private 
firms face increasingly complex decisions regarding their strategies for rais-
ing capital in various jurisdictions. In this new world, the invisible hand of 
the market, the efficient market hypothesis,1 or the spontaneous order2 re-
sulting from decisions of investors and corporations operate as loose prox-
ies for cross-border listings. Issuing securities and raising capital in a juris-
diction outside a state of domicile is no longer solely a business decision; it 
has become primarily a legal decision. When doing a probabilistic risk as-
sessment, international corporations must consider regulatory risks, project-
ed compliance costs, the risk of enforcement, and the corresponding chang-
es in enforcement policies in light of the evolution of jurisprudence and 
statutory reforms. In the United States, foreign firms’ decisions largely de-
pend on the interplay between the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC or Commission), the American watchdog of securities markets, and 
United States courts. 
The Supreme Court, unquestionably one of the leading global policy 
setters, has already acknowledged the new economic realities of interna-
tional markets, as Justice Breyer emphasized in The Court and the World.3 
It appears that the SEC, for its part, has also been responsive to globaliza-
tion. In the past fifteen years, the Commission has engaged in a series of 
regulatory reforms and has introduced extensive international cooperation 
programs with foreign regulators.4 The Commission also serves as an inter-
national standard-setter, a member of the Steering Committee of the Finan-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (discuss-
ing the efficient capital market hypothesis). 
 2 F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 97 (1969). 
 3 See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES 119–24 (2015). 
 4 See infra notes 95, 174–177. 
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cial Stability Board, and a longstanding member of the International Organ-
ization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).5 
More important from the perspective of American markets and inves-
tors is the reality that at home the SEC is overseeing the largest financial 
market in the world. About a thousand foreign corporations that are regis-
tered with the SEC and have access to U.S. investors represent a significant 
part of this market.6 The Commission sets the rules for their corporate re-
porting and enforces those rules to protect investors and ensure market effi-
ciency and integrity.7 The ascendant enforcement philosophy and the nu-
ances of prosecutorial actions in response to statutory and case law devel-
opments become the variables at the forefront of international listings. 
The breathtaking pace of international markets after the financial crisis 
of 2007–2008 demands that the Commission continuously recalibrate its 
regulations and enforcement. In the words of former Chair Mary Jo White, 
“[t]he SEC needs to find its precisely right place in that global market.”8 
This Article examines what that right place should be in the enforcement of 
the securities laws against foreign corporations and how the Commission 
should respond to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, a crucial Supreme 
Court decision that has reduced the exposure of international corporations 
to the risk of investor class-action litigation in the United States.9 
This topic is increasingly well-timed and touches upon the ongoing po-
litical “battles,” spanning what one can tentatively dub “regulation and en-
forcement versus deregulation, laissez faire, and limited extraterritoriality.” 
To give a few examples, in March 2017, a federal district court explicated a 
previously murky provision of the Dodd-Frank Act10 regarding the ability of 
the SEC to rely on a broad, essentially pre-Morrison interpretation of the 
extraterritorial reach of securities law in enforcement actions.11 The deci-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Homepage, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS, https://www.iosco.org [https://perma.cc/
4E72-GF5Z]; Members of the Steering Committee, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/
about/organisation-and-governance/members-of-the-steering-committee/ [https://perma.cc/F9B2-
U247]. 
 6 International Registered and Reporting Companies, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml [https://perma.cc/S7ZN-AXQL]. 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
 8 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION IN A CHANGING WORLD 19 (2015), https://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/
download/events/the_future_of_the_sec_in_a_changing_world.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZV2-EY4Q]. 
 9 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270–73 (2010). 
 10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (codified in sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C. (2015)). 
 11 SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1291 (D. Utah 2017) (“The fact that 
the Supreme Court issued Morrison on the last day that the conference committee met to negotiate 
a reconciliation between the House and Senate bills, and five days before the final version of the 
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sion was in favor of the Commission. As of the time of this writing, the ap-
peal was pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In their 
Reply Brief, the appellants claimed, inter alia, that “the District Court en-
gaged in both the application of overruled case law and the examination of 
outside legislative intent of the unambiguous statute.”12 
On June 5, 2017, Justice Sotomayor delivered a unanimous opinion of 
the Court in Kokesh v. SEC.13 The Court overruled the formerly ingrained 
position that disgorgement—a typical remedy sought by the SEC in district 
courts and in administrative proceedings—is an equitable remedy. The Su-
preme Court held that SEC disgorgement was a penalty and, hence, was 
subject to the five-year statute of limitations.14 Kokesh may have wide-
ranging ramifications for complex investigations, including enforcement 
actions involving cooperation with foreign regulators and international en-
forcement requests.15 If the SEC shuns foreign investigations that appear 
time-consuming, the exposure of international corporations to liability risk 
in the United States may drop.16 
Consider also that the Commissioners approve SEC enforcement ac-
tions and that President Trump's Administration has nominated new Com-
missioners whose conservative bona fides are beyond question.17 Further-
more, reports on SEC enforcement and some preliminary data on enforce-
                                                                                                                           
bill was published, does not convincingly demonstrate that Congress had changed its mind about 
codifying the conduct and effects test.”). 
 12 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 11, SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, No. 17-4059, 2017 WL 
5989247 (10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017). 
 13 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017). 
 14 Id. at 1644–45. 
 15 For the consequences of Kokesh, see generally Reflections on Kokesh v. SEC: Potential Rami-
fications of SEC Disgorgement Being a Penalty, KING & SPALDING CLIENT ALERT: SPECIAL MAT-
TERS & GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS PRACTICE GROUP (June 14, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.
com/kslaw-staging/attachments/000/004/567/original/ca061417.pdf?1498139481 [https://perma.cc/
4H5Y-GN75]. 
 16 There is, of course, some evidence that international enforcement cooperation is improving, 
which should reduce the SEC’s costs as enforcement actions proceed in other jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., Roger Silvers, The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation on Enforcement and Earnings At-
tributes 10–11 (Oct. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047913 [here-
inafter The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation]; Roger Silvers, The Influence of Cross-Border 
Cooperation on Market Quality 5–6 (Nov. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3073831 [hereinafter The Influence of Cross-Border Cooperation]; Steven R. Peikin, 
Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 9, 2017), https://wp.
nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/11/10/reflections-on-the-past-present-and-future-of-the-
secs-enforcement-of-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/ [https://perma.cc/462V-VDYM]. 
 17 See, e.g., Dave Michaels, White House to Nominate Hester Peirce as Republican SEC Com-
missioner, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-to-nominate-
hester-peirce-as-republican-sec-commissioner-1500417225 [https://perma.cc/HB2M-34QQ]. 
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ment actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) indicate 
that there is a temporal association between the changes in the Administra-
tion and the decline in SEC enforcement in 2017.18 
At the same time, other recent reports suggest that despite a decrease 
in the number of standalone cases, the overall intensity of SEC enforcement 
in 2016 and 2017 was fairly comparable.19 In addition, Chairman Clayton in 
his testimony to Congress requested a staggering $1.602 billion for the 
Commission’s 2018 budget and highlighted that the SEC’s priorities are, 
inter alia, enforcement and technological support of enforcement.20 
These conflicting policy signals and case law developments may be 
confusing to foreign corporations seeking to tap American capital markets. 
Will the SEC become more conservative in its enforcement policies? To 
what extent should we expect a complete departure from the “Broken Win-
dows” philosophy, an enforcement approach championed by Chair White to 
signal that the SEC should target all violations, large and small?21 Often, 
speeches by Chairman Clayton and other SEC officials either mention in 
passing or largely omit the international enforcement perspective.22 The 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Trump v. Obama: U.S. SEC Anti-Corruption Enforcement 
Actions Scorecard, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENF’T (Oct. 9, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/
compliance_enforcement/2017/10/09/trump-v-obama-u-s-sec-anti-corruption-enforcement-actions-
scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/VUE3-Z62A]; Cornerstone Research & NYU Pollack Center for Law 
and Business, SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries, Midyear FY 2018 
Update 1–2 (2018), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/SEC-Enforcement-
Activity-1HFY2018-Update_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBF8-H53J] (reporting a general decrease in 
enforcement against public companies). 
 19 See Urska Velikonja, Behind the Annual SEC Enforcement Report: 2017 and Beyond 1–2 
(Nov. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3074073 [https://perma.cc/AV6W-6TTQ]. 
 20 Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Testimony on the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request (June 27, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-fiscal-year-2018-budget-request [https://perma.
cc/YXD6-VRAX]. 
 21 “[T]he Broken Windows policy presumes that aggressive action against infractions of all sizes 
. . . sends a broad message that deters others from violating the law.” CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. 
COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 5 (2015), https://www.center
forcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/A9RX-8NV7]; see Mary Jo White, Former SEC Chair, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement 
Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100913mjw [https://perma.cc/E9JD-
77V9] (discussing the Broken Windows approach and observing that “[the] theory can be applied 
to our securities markets—minor violations that are overlooked or ignored can feed bigger ones, 
and, perhaps more importantly, can foster a culture where laws are increasingly treated as tooth-
less guidelines”). 
 22 See, e.g., Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director, SEC Enforcement Division, The SEC Enforcement 
Division’s Initiatives Regarding Retail Investor Protection and Cybersecurity (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-avakian-2017-10-26 [https://perma.cc/6W7V-XS5N]; Jay 
Clayton, SEC Chair, Governance and Transparency at the Commission and in Our Markets, Remarks 
at the PLI 49th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
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question of finding an optimal approach to foreign issuer enforcement re-
mains open. 
This Article seeks to shed light on these policy questions by focusing 
on the following theoretical inquiries. The first inquiry is whether the SEC 
needs to take into account the recent changes in the judicial interpretation of 
the extraterritorial provisions of U.S. law and the developments in the class-
action regime. In other words, how should the SEC respond to Morrison 
and its implications? If the Supreme Court in Morrison has created a risky 
enforcement lacuna on the side of private class actions against foreign cor-
porations, should the SEC’s response be necessary and inevitable? This 
question dovetails with and explains the second inquiry regarding an opti-
mal policy approach to enforcement of the U.S. securities laws against in-
ternational issuers. 
By seeking to answer these questions, the Article contributes to the sa-
lient longstanding debate about the relative merits of public and private en-
forcement of securities law. Numerous researchers weighed in on whether 
public enforcement and class-action litigation are complements or substi-
tutes;23 whether the U.S. “multienforcer” system is redundant;24 which 
prong, public or private, is associated with a healthy capital market;25 and 
how a liability regime may deter foreign companies from listing on Ameri-
can exchanges.26 This Article presents relevant doctrinal, socioeconomic, 
institutional, and empirical arguments. To my knowledge, this paper pre-
sents the first empirical survey of the recent changes in enforcement against 
foreign issuers.27 The research will identify the dominant strategy for the 
                                                                                                                           
speech/speech-clayton-2017-11-08 [https://perma.cc/SB9H-4QDU]; Jay Clayton, SEC Chair, Re-
marks at the Economic Club of New York (July 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
remarks-economic-club-new-york [https://perma.cc/N6XG-Z832]. 
 23 See infra notes 42–86. For new empirical data and literature review, see Stephen Choi & 
Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 
13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 27–29 (2016). 
 24 See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 285 (2016); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobac-
co, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 
(2000); James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud 
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010). 
 25 See infra notes 42–48. 
 26 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA 
L. REV. 229, 302–04 (2007); Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Manda-
tory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1190, 
1202–06 (2013). 
 27 The research covers only foreign private issuers. The term is defined in Rule 405 of the 
Securities Act (17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2018)) and Exchange Act Rule 3b-4 (17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 
 
2062 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2055 
SEC and suggest several policy adjustments necessitated by the recent doc-
trinal and economic developments. 
The paper proceeds in six parts. Part I delineates the contours of Mor-
rison and summarizes theoretical arguments on enforcement and the role of 
the SEC. Part II examines the Commission’s approach to enforcement 
against international corporations. Section C of Part II tracks enforcement 
actions against foreign firms five years before and five years after Morri-
son, between 2005 and 2016. The results suggest that enforcement remained 
relatively stable, with the exception of a continuous increase in minor ac-
tions for reporting violations throughout the research period. 
Part III explains this low-key enforcement approach and suggests that 
it is rational and inevitable. Overall, it is the dominant strategy for the 
Commission. Part IV demonstrates, however, that the traditional enforce-
ment philosophy may attract low-quality firms to American markets and 
raises a number of post-Morrison red flags associated with foreign listings 
and class action litigation. The remaining sections seek to reconcile the ra-
tionality of low-key enforcement with the realities and risks of post-
Morrison cross-listings. 
Part V reviews the doctrinal implications of Morrison and concludes 
that, if necessary, the SEC has the capacity to act aggressively against for-
eign issuers. At the same time, the doctrinal ambiguity created by Morrison 
should dampen the Commission’s incentives to act and further support its 
institutional preference for low-key enforcement. Part VI suggests solutions 
to these dilemmas. It argues that although the SEC needs to act in response 
to the red flags identified in this paper, the Commission should not 
strengthen prosecution qua prosecution. Instead, the post-Morrison trends 
call upon the Commission to design better tools for preventive monitoring. 
By focusing on low-cost preventive monitoring, the SEC should be able to 
maintain a certain level of fraud deterrence without actually ramping up 
enforcement and increasing the costs of both the SEC and the international 
companies considering listing in the United States.  
I. THEORIES OF EFFICIENT ENFORCEMENT: CLASS ACTIONS AND PUBLIC 
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FOREIGN FIRMS 
In enforcement, the first-order line of analysis should focus on a bird’s 
eye view on the social value, realities, and implications of having multiple 
enforcers such as the SEC and the plaintiffs’ bar. The following discussion 
touches upon the pros and cons of private litigation and public enforcement, 
                                                                                                                           
(2018)). The Article refers to foreign private issuers as “international companies,” “international 
corporations,” “foreign corporations,” “foreign issuers,” or “foreign firms.” 
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their potential redundancy, and the possible efficiencies of this dual system, 
such as filling the gaps in enforcement where private plaintiffs are unlikely 
to pursue certain types of cases. What is the place of Morrison in this de-
bate? Why should the SEC consider this decision in designing its enforce-
ment policy against foreign firms? 
A. Morrison and Its Implications 
The Supreme Court in 2010, in Morrison, sought to limit the extraterri-
torial reach of the antifraud provisions of securities law and to rein in global 
class actions against international corporations. The decision has restricted 
the ability of private plaintiffs to bring actions against foreign companies 
under the key antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws, including 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, as well as Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.28 After 
Morrison, a foreign issuer no longer faces the same uncertainty and risk of 
investor class-action litigation in connection with its decision to enter U.S. 
capital markets.29 
In the name of a faithful reading of the statute and of certainty, the ma-
jority in Morrison rejected the long-established “conduct test” and the “ef-
fects test” of a half a century of Second Circuit jurisprudence.30 The Second 
Circuit’s tests were laid out primarily by the legendary Judge Henry Friend-
ly.31 The old jurisdictional approach was painted with broad strokes. It 
guided courts to inquire if the significant culpable conduct took place in the 
United States and caused harm to investors, viz., all investors, including in 
some cases foreign plaintiffs. This test was dubbed the “conduct test.” Un-
der the second test, the detrimental “substantial effect” of a defendant’s ac-
tivity upon U.S. investors or upon American markets and exchanges al-
lowed federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the actions.32 
                                                                                                                           
 28 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 77l(a)(2); id. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 29 See, e.g., Yuliya Guseva, Extraterritoriality of Securities Law Redux: Litigation Five Years 
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 279. 
 30 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274–82 (2010). 
 31 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 1173 (2012) (comparing the old tests with the new test). 
 32 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257–58; SEC, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRI-
VATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at ii 
(2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CH9B-4FKG]. For an excellent overview of the case see Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme 
Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
847, 857–59 (2017). 
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This “judicial oak [of Section 10(b)] which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn”33 was mercilessly pruned by the late Justice Scalia. 
The Court observed, inter alia, that: 
The concurrence seemingly believes that the Courts of Appeals 
have carefully trimmed and sculpted this “judicial oak” into a co-
hesive canopy, under the watchful eye of Judge Henry Friendly, 
the “master arborist.” Even if one thinks that the “conduct” and 
“effects” tests are numbered among Judge Friendly’s many fine 
contributions to the law, his successors, though perhaps under the 
impression that they nurture the same mighty oak, are in reality 
tending each its own botanically distinct tree.34 
The Court cogitated about its new approach along the lines of the lead-
ing academics’ conclusions regarding the considerable uncertainty of the 
old tests and their inconsistent application.35 The Morrison Court shifted the 
emphasis of an inquiry from the conduct of defendants or the effects of their 
actions to purchases and sales of securities.36 For this reason, the new ap-
proach circumscribes the reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act within 
the realm of “domestic” transactions and listed securities.37 
An appurtenant motivation behind the decision was the global ramifi-
cations of unrestrained cross-border litigation implicating international 
capital markets and deterring foreign companies from listing on U.S. ex-
changes. Echoing academic commentators,38 Justice Scalia quipped that 
“while there is no reason to believe that the United States has become the 
Barbary Coast for those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities markets, 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 34 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 259 n.4 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 35 BREYER, supra note 3, at 123–24 (emphasizing that a need for a “more definite” territorial 
scope of the statute was recognized by the Court); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Ac-
tions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 14, 67 (2007); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of 
American Securities Regulation, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 228–29 (1996); Stephen J. Choi 
& Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467, 489–90; Fox, supra note 31, at 1184 (observing that “[c]ompared to 
restoring the conduct/effects test, using the Morrison test would reduce confusion and likely lead 
to more consistent court decision-making,” but generally proposing an alternative test). 
 36 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only 
deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered.’” (citations omitted)). 
 37 Id. at 267 (“And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchang-
es, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”); see Vincent M. 
Chiappini, How American Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Mor-
rison v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2011). 
 38 Buxbaum, supra note 35, at 16–18, 38–41, 62; Coffee, supra note 26, at 300–05. 
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some fear that it has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for 
lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities mar-
kets.”39 
After Morrison, federal courts have faithfully narrowed down the ap-
plication of the securities laws, namely, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5, to only those transactions that involve securities listed on 
U.S. exchanges and “domestic” transactions, in which either the title to the 
securities at issue passes in the United States or parties incur “irrevocable 
liability” to execute a securities transaction within the United States.40 
Courts have also extended the application of Morrison to actions brought 
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.41 As a result, there is a 
new status quo in private litigation against international issuers. This begs 
the question whether the SEC should recalibrate its policies and take Morri-
son into account. 
B. Public and Private Enforcers 
The first normative question is whether SEC enforcement would serve 
capital markets better than the extensive class-action litigation of the pre-
Morrison kind. The weight of the evidence seems to favor the SEC. On the 
one hand, researchers typically disagree on which enforcement prong—
private or public—is more efficient,42 and which one fosters a healthy secu-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270. 
 40 See, e.g., SEC v. World Capital Mkt., Inc., 864 F.3d 996, 1008–09 n.11 (9th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 135–37 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Isaacson, 752 
F.3d 1291, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mandell, 752 F.3d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 
2014); United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2013); Absolute Activist Value Master 
Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012); Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de 
Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2011); SEC v. Benger, No. 09 C 
676, 2013 WL  593952, at *9–12 (N.D. Ill. 2013); see also Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche 
Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 212–17 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 41 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 268 (“The same focus on domestic transactions is evident in the 
Securities Act . . . .”); In re Smart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 295 F.R.D. 50, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 42 On the theories of efficient enforcement, see generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 
(1980). On ideal public enforcement and comparative benefits of the two enforcement systems, 
see, for example, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post 
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 99–100 (2008) (arguing that private actions “guard against” SEC 
inaction and that “market-based accountability, discipline, and sanctions hold private attorneys 
externally accountable”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 226–27 (1983) (dis-
cussing the pros and cons of private enforcement and observing that “private enforcement may be 
able to mobilize and reallocate its resources more quickly than the public enforcer,” that “[p]rivate 
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rities market. A series of famous papers—written mainly between 1998 and 
2008 and often referred to as the “LLSV,” “Law and Finance,” and “Legal 
Origins Theory”—identify the common law legal system, disclosure, robust 
investor protection rules, and private enforcement as crucial factors associ-
ated with and, possibly, spurring the growth of capital markets.43 In an in-
fluential 2009 rebuttal, Jackson and Roe refuted at least one conclusion by 
suggesting that disclosure rules supported by public enforcement are more 
impactful variables.44 That titanic debate inspired a host of research papers 
on the topic.45 
Some papers, for instance, suggest that the inherent value of public en-
forcement is that it “level[s] the playing field for small firms who struggle 
for adequate access to equity capital.”46 Private enforcement does not pro-
duce the same equalizing effect in terms of access to capital markets.47 Re-
searchers also argue that regulatory oversight is associated with better com-
pliance, improvements in liquidity, and fewer restatements of financial re-
ports.48 
                                                                                                                           
enforcement also is potentially ‘fairer’ because the private plaintiff does not have the same built-in 
advantage as the public prosecutor or regulatory agency, to whom courts have a tendency to de-
fer,” and that a private plaintiff “performs an important failsafe function by ensuring that legal 
norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitudes of public enforcers”); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 626–30, 632 (2013) (discuss-
ing, inter alia, information processing and economies of scale and observing that “[i]n theory, at 
least, public enforcement is a more efficient means of achieving optimal deterrence of undesirable 
conduct”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1298 (1982); David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Ac-
tions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 266 (2015) (suggesting “that loss of the class action would mark a 
dramatic change to shareholder rights, to shareholder regulation more generally, and to the private 
attorney-general model that has served as a cornerstone of securities enforcement policy for dec-
ades” and that “[w]hile loss of the class action could prompt enhanced public enforcement via the 
SEC and other regulatory bodies, resource constraints suggest that public actors may be limited in 
their ability to fill the void”). 
 43 See generally Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FINANCE 1 
(2006). 
 44 See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 207 (2009). 
 45 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 26, at 242–98, 302; John Echeverri-Gent & Benjamin Bloom, 
Am. Pol. Sci. Meeting Paper, Do Competitive Politics Produce Competitive Markets? Politics of 
Financial Market Development 8–9 (Sept. 1–5, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1644631 [https://perma.cc/4XPM-958B]. For a review of the literature, see Howell E. 
Jackson & Jeffery Y. Zhang, Private and Public Enforcement of Securities Regulation, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (2015). 
 46 Douglas Cumming et al., Firm Size and the Impact of Securities Regulation, 43 J. COMP. 
ECON. 417, 427 (2015). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See, e.g., Terrence Blackburne, Regulatory Oversight and Reporting Incentives: Evidence 
from SEC Budget Allocations 28–29 (Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Dissertation Repository); Tim Lohse et al., Public Enforcement of Securi-
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On the other hand, empirical studies aside, the comparative benefits of 
public enforcement are often explored by unearthing the imperfections of 
private litigation. The germane benefits are legion. For instance, enforce-
ment agencies may have an institutional ability to fill the “gaps” left by pri-
vate enforcers.49 They also may administer penalties without distorting the 
original legislative intent and without producing precedents conflicting with 
the panoramic regulatory philosophy.50 A related argument is the expertise 
of the agencies vis-à-vis the private plaintiffs’ bar and generalist courts.51 
There is also considerable scholarship on the disparate incentives of 
public and private enforcers. For one, private parties are more prone to 
bring non-meritorious suits, i.e., cases that have little social value and fail to 
enhance social welfare.52 Another argument lies in the preoccupation of the 
                                                                                                                           
ties Market Rules: Resource-based Evidence from the Securities Exchange Commission, 106 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 197, 198–199 (2014); The Influence of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra 
note 16, at 7. 
 49 This is but one aspect of redundancy as a systemic reliability mechanism. Clopton, supra 
note 24, at 307 n.144. 
 50 Private plaintiffs, by contrast, lack a synoptic perspective and fidelity to the underlying 
regulatory objectives. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 (2002) 
(“Litigation arising from private actions almost certainly will bind regulators who employ the 
same or similar causes of action or theories. Thus, incompetent, overworked, or inexperienced 
private counsel, whose interests may diverge from the public interest, may be generating case 
precedent that restricts government regulators.”); Engstrom, supra note 42, at 639 (discussing the 
lack of judicial expertise that may lead to imperfect decisions); David Freeman Engstrom, Private 
Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1924–31 
(2014); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield 
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 606 (2008) (discussing nonenforcement and policy priorities); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 928 (2003) (“[Under certain conditions,] agencies are likely to be in a better position to de-
cide whether departures from the text actually make sense. This is so mostly because agencies 
have a superior degree of technical competence; but it is not irrelevant that agencies are subject to 
a degree of democratic supervision. Second, agencies are likely to be in a better position to know 
whether departures from the text will seriously diminish predictability or otherwise unsettle the 
statutory scheme.”). But see Coffee, Rescuing, supra note 42, at 227. 
 51 See generally Engstrom, supra note 42, at 639, 664. 
 52 See Warren F. Schwartz & C. Frederick Beckner III, Toward a Theory of the “Meritorious 
Case”: Legal Uncertainty as a Social Choice Problem, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 801, 801 (1998) 
(defining a meritorious case as “socially desirable to have maintained” and discussing judicial and 
policy approaches to identifying meritorious claims). See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Do 
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlement in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) 
(demonstrating how settlement behavior in securities class actions deviates from predictive eco-
nomic models and expected merits of cases); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Be-
tween the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). 
For a critique of the litigation system and a historical account of the private right of action, see, for 
example, Rose, supra note 24, at 2200–01; Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation 
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1307–18 (2008). 
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plaintiffs’ bar with maximizing their profits53 and building up cases that are 
more likely than not to survive a motion to dismiss. A successful dismissal 
motion counts as a procedural victory associated with settlements.54 Such 
“cherry-picking” of actions with a high projected success rate may lead to a 
suboptimal level of enforcement. 
These “cherry-picking” stratagems are grounded in the current statuto-
ry system and procedural rules.55 Because plaintiffs’ law firms bear the 
costs of a lawsuit,56 attorneys are naturally incentivized to invest in only 
potentially successful cases.57 In the first place, plaintiffs’ lawyers must en-
sure that their complaints pass muster with the court under the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act, which stays discovery pending a ruling on a 
motion to dismiss.58 
In complaints, plaintiffs must plead certain elements of the cause of ac-
tion under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including untrue statements of a 
material fact, scienter, loss causation, reliance, and others.59 Some elements, 
such as scienter, have to be pleaded with particularity.60 Others, such as loss 
                                                                                                                           
 53 On the incentive structures of enforcers, see John C. Jr. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: 
The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5; 
Landes & Posner, supra note 42, at 42–43 (observing that it “is frequently expressed that the law-
yer for the class will be tempted to ‘sell out’ the class by negotiating with the defendant's lawyer a 
settlement that will involve a combination of nominal relief in favor of the class with a large legal 
fee for its lawyer”); Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
HARV. L. REV 853, 860–62 (2014); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney Gen-
eral” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2162 (2004) (discussing the introduction 
of the profit motives and agency costs in the literature). 
 54 See A.C. Pritchard & Hillary Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions 
to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 
127–28 (2005). 
 55 See James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 
737, 744 (2003) (underscoring that “numerous regulatory provisions of the securities laws create 
problems that prevent the meaningful pursuit of violations by private plaintiffs” and that “the loss 
. . . may not rise to a sufficient level to attract the interest of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attor-
ney”); Pritchard & Sale, supra note 54. 
 56 See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evi-
dence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 925–26 (1996) (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys 
must invest substantial amounts of effort in examining the merits of a case before drafting a com-
plaint. Such a process requires substantial care due to the large up-front costs plaintiffs’ attorneys 
incur in pursuing a securities case on a contingent-fee basis.” (citations omitted)). 
 57 In this sense, “the attorney acts less as an agent and more as a principal,” which is the es-
sence of “entrepreneurial litigation.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA L. REV. 1895, 1897 (2017). 
 58 Pritchard & Sale, supra note 54, at 128. 
 59 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b) (2012). 
 60 See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318–25 (2007). 
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causation, require compliance with ordinary pleading rules.61 As the Su-
preme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo emphasized in 2005, 
however, even under the ordinary pleading rules “a plaintiff who has suf-
fered an economic loss [needs] to provide a defendant with some indication 
of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”62 
Plaintiffs also need to show reliance, which is another element of the 
cause of action under Section 10(b).63 Three years ago, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its long-standing holding in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.64 As the 
Court stated in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., if a securities 
market is efficient, an “investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by 
the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price” and only needs 
to show, inter alia, that “misrepresentations were publicly known” and ma-
terial and that the plaintiff traded the stock.65 
These procedural hurdles limit the profitable range of class actions.66 
For example, it should be easier for plaintiffs’ attorneys to show reliance 
“on the integrity” of the market price where securities are traded on effi-
cient national exchanges as opposed to a less liquid over-the-counter plat-
form. Attorneys can more easily find listed issuers’ misleading reports, 
which are filed with the SEC, effortlessly track share prices on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq, and have experts run event stud-
ies to identify a corresponding market reaction and a statistically significant 
abnormal return around a public announcement by the defendant. Other 
cases may be rationally ignored absent a “smoking gun” or a compelling 
justification to bring an action. 
Class actions against domestic and foreign issuers share these proce-
dural and case-selection characteristics. In foreign issuer litigation, the 
“U.S. plaintiffs’ bar performs its expected role in the presence of actionable 
events to hold foreign firms accountable.”67 The typical triggers searched 
for by attorneys are accounting restatements, missing forecasts, share price 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Not all circuits are in agreement regarding the standards. See, e.g., Lormand v. U.S. Un-
wired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255–64 (2009); cf. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 
185–90 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 62 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
 63 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2409–11, 2413–14 (2014). 
 64 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 65 Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2413, 2422 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 
(1988)). 
 66 On attorneys’ costs and their impact on litigation, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi, Do the 
Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 
600 (2006). 
 67 Beiting Cheng et al., Securities Litigation Risk for Foreign Companies Listed in the U.S. 32 
(June 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163864 
[https://perma.cc/2KTC-T7G8]. 
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drops, and corporate reports containing untrue statements of material facts 
or material omissions.68 These triggers actuate most antifraud lawsuits and 
generally predetermine attorney behavior. 
C. Private Litigation Against Foreign Issuers 
There are at least three additional factors that may dampen attorneys’ 
incentives to bring class actions against foreign firms. One difference be-
tween domestic and foreign enforcement realities stems from the tools 
available to foreign companies seeking to minimize their litigation risk. 
Namely, when a firm is less “visible” or has a smaller presence in U.S. mar-
kets, its law-related risks may be systematically lower. The factors associat-
ed with an increased risk of litigation include, inter alia: the size of a firm; 
the likelihood of higher damage awards; poor stock performance; high share 
turnover and volatility, explained by the rule that damages are “an increas-
ing function of the number of shares that trade at misleading prices;”69 hav-
ing more assets located in the United States;70 and listing on U.S. exchang-
es.71 In sum, these factors are mostly related to exchange-trading and asset 
location. The first helps attorneys identify and adequately plead a violation, 
whereas the second is related to the enforcement of judgments. 
An international corporation may more easily maneuver around these 
risks than a domestic company. For example, a foreign firm may keep its 
listing on a foreign exchange, delist from a U.S. exchange, deregister its 
securities with the SEC, terminate its reporting obligations, and move trad-
ing of U.S. securities to an over-the-counter (“OTC”) platform.72 If indicia 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See, e.g., SEC Enforcement Activities 17 CFR § 202.5 (2018) (listing several investigation 
triggers considered by the staff); Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evi-
dence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 393–94 (2015) (observing 
that “the most lucrative and successful class actions are those associated with restatements and 
accounting irregularities” and that “private securities litigation targets only one type of securities 
violation—accounting fraud”); see also Pritchard & Sale, supra note 54, at 130–35; Cheng et al., 
supra note 67, at 4. 
 69 Amar Gande & Darius P. Miller, Why Do U.S. Securities Laws Matter to Non-U.S. Firms? 
Evidence from Private Class-Action Lawsuits 13 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939059 [https://perma.cc/ZD9L-FZAC]. 
 70 Id. at 11–13, 29–30. The authors also find that inadequate legal protection of minority share-
holders in the country of domicile increases the likelihood of litigation; cf. Craig Doidge et al., Why 
Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 210–15 (2004); William A. 
Jr. Reese & Michael. S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in 
the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 65 (2002); Jordan Siegel, 
Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 
319, 342, 346–49; Cheng et al. supra note 67, at 2–6. 
 71 See Guseva, supra note 29, at 273–78. 
 72 On the mechanics of delisting and switching to OTC trading, see, for example, DEUTSCHE 
BANK, FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER DELISTING AND DEREGISTRATION 8–10 (Aug. 2014), https://www.
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of fraud are teased out from a combination of corporate reports filed with 
the SEC, accounting restatements, and sharp share price fluctuations on ef-
ficient national exchanges, private plaintiffs could either miss or purposely 
avoid less “visible” defendants. Hence, attorneys will be systematically tar-
geting mostly larger international corporations with securities listed on effi-
cient national exchanges.73 
This case-selection strategy dovetails with unique transaction costs. 
This is the second difference in class-action litigation against domestic 
firms and against foreign issuers. Even though issuers from countries with 
inadequate investor protection, reporting rules, and judicial systems, as well 
as investors in their securities, could benefit from more rigorous monitoring 
and prosecution in the United States,74 profit-chasing plaintiffs’ attorneys 
may strategically avoid those cases.75 
For one, working with foreign courts—for instance, seeking assistance 
with discovery or enforcement of judgments—may be infeasible and costly. 
Second, an attorney may not have the expertise to parse financial statements 
and corporate reports filed by an issuer with foreign authorities and to iden-
tify misleading statements of material facts or omissions. Hence, a private 
enforcer anticipates that she may not amass sufficient evidence to bring a 
successful action without additional investment and, for example, retaining 
local experts. 
Third, the attorney should account for the probability that after spend-
ing considerable resources on building up a case, discovery, and litigation, 
she might be unable to enforce a judgment rendered by a U.S. court. Some, 
albeit not many, foreign jurisdictions are hostile to the U.S. opt-out-class-
                                                                                                                           
adr.db.com/drweb/public/en/docs/Whitepaper-Foreign_Private_Issuer_Delisting_and_Deregistration.
pdf [https://perma.cc/VTE9-TSKQ]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6 (2018). 
 73 See, e.g., Guseva, supra note 29, at 273–78; Siegel, supra note 70, at 346–49; Cheng et al. 
supra note 67, at 2–6; Gande & Miller, supra note 69; Consequently, a foreign company opting 
for non-exchange-traded securities will face less exposure to liability under sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and to fraud-on-the-market class actions under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act. 
 74 The likelihood of fraud and compliance with accounting rules are “a function of [the 
firms’] home environment.” Audra L. Boone et al., The Information Environment of Cross-Listed 
Firms: Evidence from the Supply and Demand of SEC Filings 2 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.business.uq.edu.au/sites/default/files/events/files/cross-listing-disclosures-may-2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RL82-M9TB]; see Rose, supra note 24, at 2182 (observing that the likeli-
hood of fraud depends, inter alia, on “the mores of a nation’s business and financial community 
. . . as well as the size and structure of a nation’s securities markets”). Not all countries ensure 
equal transparency and investor protection. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 43, at 13–19; The 
Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
 75 On the findings on the likelihood of litigation, see supra notes 69–73; see also Cheng et al., 
supra note 67, at 32 (suggesting “that factors that increase the costs to pursue litigation against 
firms in foreign countries lower the rate of lawsuits against foreign companies listed in the U.S.”). 
2072 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2055 
action regime, whereas in others, recognition proceedings entail unique 
transaction costs either because of local judicial inefficiencies and the ab-
sence of equivalent local procedures or on procedural grounds.76 
In short, there are additional reasons to expect that the plaintiffs’ costs 
of litigation against international corporations may exceed comparable liti-
gation costs in domestic cases. The higher expected transaction costs and 
enforcement uncertainties should reduce the incentives of attorneys to pro-
ceed against international corporations without substantial presence and 
assets in the United States.77 
The third difference is that Morrison has reduced the “return” on pri-
vate attorneys’ efforts. My previous research suggests that the mean and 
median post-Morrison settlements have shrunk. So has a typical plaintiff 
class.78 Admittedly, as Professor Coffee observed in Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion, resourceful American law firms are seeking ways to bring suits in for-
eign jurisdictions. In some cases, they file foreign actions after a parallel 
action in the United States and “obtaining discovery in the U.S. under the 
more liberal U.S. rules and utilizing it in the later . . . action.”79 Uncertain-
ties abound, however, because shareholder class actions and claim aggrega-
tion are still in their infancy in most countries around the globe.80 In any 
case, as Morrison changes the profitability of domestic litigation, it should 
also modify the behavior of American law firms in U.S. courts. 
To summarize, a plaintiffs’ attorney must take into account that her 
payout is a priori lower after Morrison because a projected settlement, 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and En-
forcement of U.S. Judgments Abroad, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 965, 986, 994–97 (2013); 
Kevin M. Clermont, Solving the Puzzle of Transnational Class Actions, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 69, 69–
70 (2015), https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11182&context=ilj 
[https://perma.cc/7E4A-YPXQ]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1898, 1925 (2016); Richard Fenti-
man, Recognition, Enforcement and Collective Judgments, in CROSS-BORDER CLASS ACTIONS: 
THE EUROPEAN WAY 85–91 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nikitas E. Hatzimihail eds., 2014); Antonio Gidi, 
The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 893, 916, 921, 933–46 (2012); Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in England and 
Wales of United States Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433, 475–80 (2011). 
 77 Cheng et al., supra note 67, at 32 (“Firms in countries that are farther from the U.S., those 
that have weaker judicial efficiency in the home country or from countries with a weaker track 
record of prior U.S. acquisitions are less likely to be targeted by plaintiff investors and attorneys. 
This suggests that factors that increase the costs to pursue litigation against firms in foreign coun-
tries lower the rate of lawsuits against foreign companies listed in the U.S.”); The Effects of 
Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, at 1 (showing “that the probability of SEC enforcement 
[also] increases in U.S.-listed foreign firms whose home countries join the MMOU”). 
 78 See Guseva, supra note 29, at 263–67, 271–73. 
 79 See Coffee, supra note 76, at 1914; see also id. at 1904–06, 1910, 1922 (outlining the cur-
rent state of the law and possible future developments). 
 80 See, e.g., id. at 1918, 1922–23 (discussing some relevant policy arguments). 
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which is often the only plausible finale of a class-action complaint that sur-
vives a motion to dismiss, has declined. Obviously, there is not a commen-
surate decrease in the average costs of bringing a successful suit. Further-
more, international litigation raises additional transaction costs associated 
with the issuer’s “visibility,” the initial complaint filing, discovery, and en-
forcement of judgments. 
Cross-border class actions essentially represent a special case of 
Landes and Posner’s “overenforcement theorem”—compared with public 
enforcement, the greater fines, probability of apprehension, and social loss 
would result from private enforcement81 through class actions involving 
larger and more visible companies from jurisdictions where discovery and 
enforcement are more cost-efficient. 
A systematic “fissure” in enforcement could thus be created as more 
“visible” listed issuers would suffer from excessive plaintiff monitoring 
and, possibly, “strike” suits. All the while, others would routinely slip 
through the cracks in the civil liability machinery, and the victims of their 
fraud could be undercompensated on average.82 In such a scenario, public 
enforcement may compensate “defrauded investors in cases where private 
litigation is not serving its compensatory function.”83 Enforcement agencies 
may also improve compliance by an average foreign corporation and control 
opportunism and expropriation.84 When a regulator operates as a “gap-
filler,” it transcends a purely Blackstonian distinction between public 
wrongs and private civil injuries.85 It performs both functions.86 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Landes & Posner, supra note 42, at 11–16, 38 (“[A]ll laws would be enforced that yielded a 
positive expected net return [on private enforcers’ investment in litigation].”). 
 82 For instance, the principal benefits of antifraud liability, such as victim compensation, 
would become crucial in the case of smaller firms where the price impact of fraud may be less 
observable. Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. 
CORP. L. 347, 377–78 (2014). 
 83 See Velikonja, supra note 68, at 394. 
 84 See, e.g., Roger Silvers, The Valuation Impact of SEC Enforcement Actions on Nontarget 
Foreign Firms, 54 J. ACCT. RES. 187, 188–89 (2016) (reviewing theories suggesting that en-
forcement constrains expropriation and agency costs in foreign firms). Amir N. Licht et al., What 
Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-
Listed Firms, J. FIN. ECON., May 2018, at 2–4 (summarizing the literature on the bonding hypoth-
esis and enforcement).  
 85 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 585 (L.K. Strouse & 
Co. 1892) (1765) (“Private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringement or privation of the civil 
rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and 
misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole com-
munity, considered as community, in its social aggregate capacity.”). 
 86 See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 24, at 291; Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation 
and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2380 (2016); Amanda M. Rose, Designing an Effi-
cient Securities-Fraud Deterrence Regime, in PROSPERITY UNLEASHED: SMARTER FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 256 (2017) (“[C]ivil penalties can be thought of as those meant to ‘price’ behavior, 
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II. REALITIES OF ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FOREIGN ISSUERS: AN 
EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
A. The Traditional Enforcement Approach 
Previous research suggests that the SEC may serve as a “gap-filler” by 
targeting defendants that private enforcers ignore, such as firms with lower 
market capitalization, firms in financial distress, and minor infractions.87 
This role, however, may be more characteristic of domestic enforcement, 
because the Commission has traditionally focused on domestic rather than 
foreign companies. The two major comprehensive studies on enforcement 
against foreign issuers, by Natalya Shnitser and Jordan Siegel, suggested 
that the SEC had commenced fewer meaningful actions against foreign is-
suers than against domestic firms.88 An interesting case study by Erica Gor-
ga also documented how the private plaintiffs’ bar promptly acted in the 
case of speculative trading by large Brazilian corporations, while the SEC, 
in contrast to the Brazilian regulator, failed to take action.89 Overall, the 
general lack of SEC enforcement against cross-listed firms was demonstrat-
ed by several empirical studies.90 
                                                                                                                           
whereas criminal penalties can be thought of as those meant to ‘sanction’ behavior.”). A germane 
example of these prosecutorial and compensatory functions of the SEC is the Fair Funds provi-
sions of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012). The statutes have al-
lowed distribution of disgorged profits and civil penalties collected by the SEC to private inves-
tors. See, e.g., Cox, supra, at 2320–21 (discussing the “Fair Funds”); Clopton, supra note 24, at 
297; Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1111–44 (2008). 
 87 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Response, Securities Class Actions as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 73, 80–81 (2011), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1084&context=penn_law_review_online [https://perma.cc/44RC-WPYS]; Cox et al., supra note 
55, at 764; Velikonja, supra note 68, at 332, 394; Natalya Shnitser, Note, A Free Pass for Foreign 
Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 
1638, 1660–84, 1693 (2010); cf. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 23, at 36; James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since 
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 901–02 (2005) (“[T]he SEC appears to be targeting much 
larger companies during the post-January 1, 2002, period than it did in the earlier time frame. 
Average market capitalization for SEC enforcement targets was more than twenty-three times 
bigger in the post-January 1, 2002, time period than in the earlier period, while the median market 
capitalization went up by a multiple of over thirteen times.”). 
 88  Siegel, supra note 70, at 342, 349 (2005) (observing that “the SEC had taken few enforce-
ment actions against cross-listed foreign firms during 1934–2002” and “that the SEC has not been 
able and/or willing to be the world’s governance enforcement agency”); Shnitser, supra note 87, at 
1675–84. 
 89 Erica Gorga, Is U.S. Law Enforcement Stronger Than That of a Developing Country? The 
Case of Securities Fraud by Brazilian Corporations and Lessons for the Private and Public En-
forcement Debate, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 617–18, 687 (2016). 
 90 The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, at 15–16 (providing a summary of 
the literature). 
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Admittedly, international enforcement has dramatically increased,91 
and the market takes notice of the most notorious actions against interna-
tional corporations.92 The probability of public actions against foreign firms 
is also associated with cross-border enforcement cooperation as more juris-
dictions are joining the 2002 Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, 
which facilitates enforcement cooperation among IOSCO members.93 
Nevertheless, despite the well-documented “aggressiveness” of the 
SEC vis-à-vis its foreign homologues,94 it appears that foreign issuers do 
not face prosecutorial wrath comparable to that faced by domestic issuers.95 
Possibly, the Commission relies heavily on the efforts of the plaintiffs’ bar 
to ferret out international fraudsters. This overarching policy preference is 
self-explanatory—“American law relies upon private litigants to enforce 
substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to 
the discretion of public enforcement agencies.”96 In the international regula-
tory context, this dependence on private plaintiffs’ assistance coincides with 
the systematic “fissures” in private enforcement discussed in Part I. 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Silvers, supra note 84, at 192–93; The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, 
at 6, 14; The Influence of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, at 2, 14. 
 92 See, e.g., G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the 
World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 REV. FIN. 99, 119 (2006) (citing studies suggesting 
“that, though the numbers of actions are few, some of the cases have been important and noticed 
. . . and that the numbers are biased downward by the many cases settled out of court”). 
 93 The Effects of Cross-Border Cooperation, supra note 16, at 28–36; see IOSCO, MULTI-
LATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION 
AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 2 (last updated May 2012), https://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6GG-WYJW]. 
 94 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 26, at 254–84; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Rede-
signing the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 728–29 (2009); 
Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 280–85 (2007). 
 95 In addition, foreign firms enjoy lower costs of reporting and compliance due to a more 
permissive regulatory approach taken by the SEC in the past fifteen years. For instance, the Com-
mission introduced simplified disclosure forms for foreign firms, exempted them from Regulation 
FD, allowed filing of financial statements prepared in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards as opposed to U.S. GAAP, amended Rule 12h-6, allowed suspension of re-
porting obligations immediately upon filing of Form 15F, and introduced some exemptions from 
Regulation G and Sarbanes-Oxley. For an overview of the regulations, see Guseva, supra note 29, 
at 207–13; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization 
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1077 (“[T]here are two very distinct tiers of inves-
tor protection in the United States: a more rigorous standard for domestic companies and a less 
rigorous one for foreign companies.”). 
 96 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669, 669 (1986). 
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B. Reporting Flaws 
This Article is the first attempt to analyze recent changes in SEC en-
forcement around the Morrison decision.97 Changing enforcement tack may 
be subtle and difficult to identify compared to the interplay between statuto-
ry actions and their corresponding implementation through regulations.98 As 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act,99 for instance, agency rule-
making is transparent and public.100 The legislature’s actions and the result-
ant reactions of the regulators are easily identifiable to a researcher, whereas 
market participants are fully informed of the reform and have sufficient 
time to adjust to its implications. 
When it comes to changes in enforcement trends, however, it takes 
time to determine explicit patterns and well-calibrated reactions.101 Moreo-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Shnitser, Siegel, and Silvers examine samples within a different timeframe. The samples 
are also different. My sample, for example, does not include directors and officers of foreign 
firms. See supra notes 70, 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 98 For example, the SEC meticulously documents Dodd-Frank rules and adopting releases. 
See Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Pending Ac-
tion, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml [https://perma.cc/
LL4Q-9RHB]. 
 99 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106–09 (1998). 
 100 It often begins with either a concept release seeking public input on the most complex 
issues or a rule proposal published for notice and public comment in the Federal Register and on 
the SEC’s webpage and completes with the rule adoption. In adopting releases, the Commission 
typically conducts a cost-benefit analysis, addresses public comments, and either modifies the 
proposed rule accordingly or attempts to provide cogent explanations why the rule should be en-
acted as originally proposed. See, e.g., Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order 
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (“Our regulatory system must protect public . . . 
welfare . . . while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation. . . . 
It must identify and use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regu-
latory ends. It must take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative.”); 
Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); 
Improving Government Regulations, Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978); OFFICE 
OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011), https://www.federal
register.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AVP-VWD9]; SEC, 
RULEMAKING PROCESS: AUDIT NO. 347 (July 12, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/
aboutoigaudit347finhtm.html [https://perma.cc/4873-Q6DL]; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 
542 (2003) (“To the extent notice-and-comment rulemaking issues general rules that rely for their 
enforcement on further proceedings, it also promotes predictability. At a minimum, it allows af-
fected parties, who participate in the formulation of the rule, to anticipate the rule and plan accord-
ingly.”). 
 101 This is not to say that the SEC does not react promptly to judicial decisions. For instance, 
“[i]n response to a charge from Chairman Schapiro after a federal circuit court called the SEC’s 
economic analysis arbitrary and capricious, the Division of Economic Research and Analysis 
(DERA) created a framework for converting large databases into meaningful, sensible, common 
sense economic analysis in order to inform its rule-making. That effort was described in the 
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ver, the Commission’s stance on prosecution is not always clear and may be 
misleading to the court of public opinion. Consider as examples a spike in 
enforcement actions and the increased budget of the SEC and its Division of 
Enforcement in recent years.102 In its November 2016 Agency Financial 
Report, the SEC announced that it “continued to build an impressive record 
of cases that spanned the spectrum of the securities industry. The SEC end-
ed the fiscal year with a record 548 stand-alone enforcement actions, plus 
195 follow-on proceedings and 125 delinquent filing proceedings, for a to-
tal of 868 enforcement actions.”103 The numbers represent a continuous and 
steady increase in enforcement actions over the years. 
These reported trends are not necessarily a prosecutorial response to 
the recent financial crisis, because “the financial crisis cases are done for 
the most part.”104 There is a more practical explanation for tougher prosecu-
tion. The SEC, as opposed to some other agencies, is not self-funding.105 
Congress decides on its budget each year. In making its decisions, Congress 
relies on “objective metrics,”106 such as the number of actions and the 
                                                                                                                           
Commission’s Guidance to Economic Analysis.” THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 36. The changes followed Business Roundtable v. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See Joshua T. White, The Evolv-
ing Role of Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 50 GA. L. REV. 293, 303–04, 307–10 (2015) 
(discussing the changes). In contrast to rulemaking, enforcement is changing slowly, which may 
be explained by multiple factors. The staff “has too many investigations” and “there seems to be 
less and less opportunity to have a meaningful dialogue with the staff, especially in the regional 
offices.” THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 15. 
 102 SEC, FY 2016 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM 60 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/about/
reports/sec-fy2016-budget-request-by-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W9V-E3QM] (showing annual 
increases in the costs of the Enforcement Division); Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforce-
ment Results for FY 2016 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html 
[https://perma.cc/32G4-6KA8] (providing a table summarizing the increases in enforcement results 
over the past three years). 
 103 See SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 16 (2016), https://www.sec.
gov/about/secpar/secafr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX4Q-TWXZ]. 
 104 THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 15. 
 105 Id. at 23 (citing Chair White expressing a preference for a self-funding Commission and 
mentioning that “there is no reason not to fund the crying resource needs at the SEC”). On the related 
institutional design and agency independence issues, see, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & 
Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611, 644–48, 657 
(2010); Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-
Making, 106 PUB. CHOICE 243, 244–47 (2001). 
 106 John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 
2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-has-gone-wrong/ 
[https://perma.cc/FV7T-KV79] (“[T]he SEC needs to be able to use objective metrics to justify its 
request for budget increases. By bringing many actions and settling them cheaply, it can point to an 
increase in the aggregate penalties collected, even if the median penalty is at the same time decreas-
ing. This may impress Congress . . . .”). 
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amount of penalties,107 reported by the Commission in congressional hear-
ings.108 As the SEC routinely cites its enhanced enforcement activity to jus-
tify annual budget requests,109 some scholars suggest that pure self-interest 
may lead it to redouble enforcement efforts or numbers. Instead of actually 
prosecuting more cases, as Velikonja’s 2016 study of annual enforcement 
reports demonstrates, the Commission may be inflating the numbers by 
double-counting some actions.110 
C. Enforcement Actions Between 2005 and 2016 
If Morrison has entailed an underenforcement problem due to inade-
quate private litigation or has deprived American investors of a meaningful 
remedy, the SEC may have responded accordingly. My working hypothesis 
was that there would be more enforcement actions against foreign compa-
nies after Morrison. The below results suggest that this has not happened. 
Instead, the caseload and actions brought under the antifraud provisions of 
the securities law remained comparatively stable. 
Because the SEC summary statistics may be opaque, the first task of 
this research project was to develop a comprehensive database. My research 
assistants and I hand-collected data on the actions against foreign private 
issuers (“FPIs”) registered with the SEC and FPIs not registered with the 
SEC. First, we started with the list of registered and reporting FPIs. The list 
was obtained from the SEC’s webpage. It included companies registered 
between 2005 and 2015.111 The SEC identifies companies registered as of 
December 31 of the respective year. 
The second step was to capture companies not registered with the 
SEC. I used the database of American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) of 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 645 (2010); Coffee, supra note 106. 
 108 See, e.g., Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY Budget Request: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities 
and Exchange Commission), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/114-10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YE3K-EU8G] (“We have continued to aggressively and fairly enforce the securities laws, 
requiring admissions in appropriate cases, filing 755 enforcement actions, and obtaining orders for 
more than $4.16 billion in disgorgement and penalties in Fiscal Year 2014.”). 
 109 See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement 
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906–19 (2016). 
 110 Id. at 932–67. Depending on one’s opinions on the administrative state, the SEC’s measur-
ing metrics may be viewed either as imprecise due to the complexity of the data the staff handles 
or as somewhat self-serving. From a practical perspective, they also permit the Commission to 
apply for higher appropriations, allocate its scarce enforcement resources toward certain priorities, 
and maintain its reputation for zealous enforcement without draconian prosecutions.  
 111 The list of International Registered and Reporting Companies is available at https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml [https://perma.cc/6DYF-NQGF]. 
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BNY Mellon as a starting point.112 I reviewed foreign companies trading 
ADRs on various U.S. OTC platforms between 2005 and 2015 and added 
sponsored ADRs to the SEC list of registered and reporting FPIs. Third, I 
crosschecked the two lists to eliminate duplicates. Fourth, I reviewed the 
combined database to identify companies which were listed in different 
markets at different points in time and/or had similar company names.  
To identify decisions against the foreign private issuers included in the 
database, my assistants and I searched Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloom-
berg Law databases.113 We also reviewed the decisions of Administrative 
Law Judges114 and the SEC enforcement data,115 including litigation releas-
es and notices, Commission opinions, and adjudicatory orders. We excluded 
(1) cases against corporations registered in the United States, regardless of 
their principal place of business; (2) cases against domestic subsidiaries of 
foreign private issuers; (3) cases against broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers either registered with the SEC or operating without registration in 
violation of the securities law and the SEC’s rules and regulations; and (4) 
generally, cases against U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks and financial in-
stitutions registered in the United States.  
Consulting firms, such as Cornerstone Research or NERA Consulting, 
track mainly class actions. The new Securities Enforcement Empirical Da-
tabase (“SEED”) of the NYU Pollack Center for Law and Business and 
Cornerstone Research provides data only on enforcement actions against 
listed companies and includes only actions initiated after 2009. I used the 
data shared with me by the NYU SEED to crosscheck our results. 
To categorize the cases, I used the “initial dates” of actions, such as  
the dates of orders instituting administrative proceedings (“OIP”) pursuant 
to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, orders instituting 
cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, complaints filed in federal district courts, or orders of 
suspension of trading pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 BNY Mellon, Depositary Receipts, https://www.adrbnymellon.com/ [https://perma.cc/
6B3Y-VHTQ]. 
 113 We also used the following terms: “foreign issuer,” “foreign private issuer,” “ADR,” 
“ADS,” “depositary receipt,” and “depositary share.” 
 114 See ALJ Initial Decisions: Administrative Law Judges, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
aljdec.shtml [https://perma.cc/D5V8-97MQ] (providing the decisions of administrative law judges). 
 115 See Enforcement, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml [https://perma.cc/647M-95FW] 
(providing information on SEC enforcement actions). 
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This survey is structured based on the logistics of enforcement.116 
Generally, after a thorough investigation of a matter under inquiry, the staff 
submits a recommendation for enforcement to the Commission.117 Many 
targets simultaneously submit settlement offers. The offers are presented to 
the Commission, together with the recommendations of the staff and often 
before the commencement of an administrative proceeding or court action. 
The Commission either issues an OIP if it decides to adjudicate the matter 
“in-house” or proceeds with filing a suit in the federal district court. Availa-
ble judicial relief ranges from injunctions to civil monetary penalties, dis-
gorgement, and others.118 Administrative relief includes, inter alia, cease-
and-desist orders, civil monetary penalties, disgorgement, orders to comply 
with reporting obligations, trading suspensions, and revocation of the regis-
tration of a security.119 
To summarize, the following survey covers all enforcement actions 
brought by the SEC either in administrative proceedings or in federal courts 
between January 2005 and December 2016, about five years before and five 
years after the Morrison decision. The final sample includes 151 cases 
against foreign firms. Appendix I lists all respondents in administrative pro-
ceedings and defendants in court actions by year and indicates the respec-
tive statutory violations.120  
The FPIs in the sample were often charged with several violations of 
the securities laws. The SEC brought actions under the major antifraud pro-
visions of the securities laws, including Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Section 17 of the Securities Act, in about 8% of the cas-
es. Issuer reporting and delinquent filing violations under Section 13(a) of 
the Exchange Act represented 77% of the actions.121 Violations of Sections 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 683–802 (Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. 
Painter & Margaret V. Sachs eds., 2017). 
 117 First, there is an informal investigation, which often produces voluntary cooperation of 
potential targets. The second stage involves conducting a formal investigation and recommending an 
enforcement action. At that point, the target is typically invited to file a Wells Submission, in which it 
often attempts to explain why enforcement proceedings should not be instituted. 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.1–
.212 (2018); id. §§ 203.1–.8; SEC, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL §§ 2.3–.6 (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYE4-URA5]. 
 118 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u (2015). 
 119 See, e.g., id. §§ 77h-1; 78u-2; 78u-3; 78l(j). 
 120 Appendix I is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 121 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). This finding is consistent with the previous research by Shnitser, who 
covered enforcement actions between 2000 and 2008. Her research used a slightly different sam-
ple selection technique and included FPIs, their employees, and subsidiaries. Shnitser, supra note 
87, at 1664–69, 1671. The exposure to liability for materially misleading reports is substantial. 
See, e.g., AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 103, at 20–23. 
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13(b)(2) and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act122 cumulatively comprised about 
28%. More serious violations under Section 13(b)(5), which provides that 
“[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a 
system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, rec-
ord, or account,”123 constituted 3% of the sample. FCPA violations were a 
significant part of Section 13(b)(2) and (5) violations and represented as 
many as 18% of all the actions in the database.124 Figure 1 traces the num-
ber of defendants and respondents by year. 125  
Figure 1: All Court Filings and Administrative Proceedings 
This upward trend was driven primarily by an increase in Section 13(a) 
actions for reporting violations. Consider the following graph that covers 
100 standalone violations of Section 13(a) and excludes the actions brought 
under the other provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.126 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 122 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2015). 
 123 Id. § 78m(b)(5). 
 124 Although FCPA actions are not a direct substitute for class actions, FCPA enforcement 
may alert investors that some firms are “bad actors.” This information should be impounded in the 
share price. 
 125 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 126 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
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Figure 2: Reporting Violations of Section 13(a) and Rules Promulgated Thereunder 
Figure 3 summarizes more serious violations of the antifraud provi-
sions and the books and records provision, namely, Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 of the Exchange Act, Section 17 of the Securities Act, and Sections 
13(b)(2)(A)&(B) and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act.127  
 
Figure 3: Fraud Actions and Violations of Section 13(b)(2)&(5) 
 
Separately, typical securities fraud cases brought under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5—the quintessential weapon of private plaintiffs in class-
                                                                                                                           
 127 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
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action litigation—and under Section 17 remained rare. There does not seem 
to be a clear pattern in this enforcement area.128 
Figure 4: Actions Under Rule 10b-5 and Section 17 
 Similarly, despite the public attention paid to FCPA enforcement dur-
ing the final years of President Obama’s Administration, there was no ex-
plicit long-term trend in enforcement against foreign issuers.129 This may be 
related to similarly enhanced anti-bribery enforcement in other countries.130 
Figure 5: FCPA Violations 
 In terms of penalties, the majority of reporting violations under Section 
13(a) and rules promulgated thereunder resulted in trading suspensions fol-
                                                                                                                           
 128 Figure 4 is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 129 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 130 TRACE, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT (Mar. 2018), https://traceinternational.org/
Uploads/PublicationFiles/GER2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y656-MN5J]. 
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lowed by the revocation of the registration of securities of foreign firms.131 I 
reviewed the SEC EDGAR database to determine the dates of the last re-
ports filed by foreign private issuers whose registration was revoked and 
included  in my data the dates of the reports filed on Form 20-F, Form 40-F, 
Form 10-K, and Form 10-Q; registration statements; or amendments there-
to. 
In line with the previous research on the timing of enforcement, the 
OIPs and ultimate revocations were issued against foreign issuers that were 
delinquent in filings for two-three years on average.132 Figure 6 presents the 
annual averages of the number of months elapsed between the dates of the 
last filings and the following OIPs.133 
Figure 6: Average Number of Months Between Filed Reports 
and Enforcement Actions 
A plausible explanation of this tardiness is that, as a policy matter, the 
Commission does not interdict trading between willing buyers and sellers 
absent a threat of substantial public harm.134 Another explanation is that the 
SEC relies on market gatekeepers such as broker-dealers. Under Rule 15c2-
11, for instance, broker-dealers cannot publish a quotation before reviewing 
                                                                                                                           
 131 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j). 
 132 Shnitser reported that some issuers were delinquent in periodic filings for “more than sev-
en years.” Shnitser, supra note 87, at 1673. For examples of actions, see Dragon Bright Mintai 
Botanical Tech. Cayman Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 78439 (July 29, 2016); Oriental Nonfer-
rous Metals Tech. Co., Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 76252 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 133 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 134 See Defunct Company, Stock Continues to Trade, SEC (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.sec.
gov/fast-answers/answersdfnctcohtm.html [https://perma.cc/ASS8-XPQJ]. 
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certain information about a company and forming “a reasonable basis under 
the circumstances for believing that . . . [the] information is accurate in all 
material respects.”135 Finally, this consistent tardiness may be related to the 
need to economize on enforcement resources, the unwillingness of the 
agency to spend resources on routine “housekeeping” of low value in terms 
of publicity,136 or reliance on foreign enforcers. Another plausible explana-
tion is that the actual harm should be contained within small groups of in-
vestors because the securities of issuers delinquent in their filings for a con-
siderable period of time may be illiquid and are traded OTC. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the Part VI, there is no need to put small 
groups of investors in harm’s way, give a certain stratum of foreign issuers a 
free pass, and impose additional monitoring costs on broker-dealers in this 
case. A failure to do routine “housekeeping” and revoke the registration of 
securities more promptly may expose investors to foreign securities with no 
current information for several years. As years pass, some foreign firms 
may avoid antifraud liability either because of the statute of repose137 or due 
to the unwillingness of the plaintiffs’ bar to bring cases against smaller and 
less “visible” foreign companies, the extent of which is discussed in Part I. 
Although the tide may be turning as the Commission is improving its re-
porting database, it is still playing catch-up with untimely reporting. 
I also examined changes in enforcement preferences in terms of the 
balance between civil court and administrative enforcement actions. Since 
2010, there has been a substantial increase in in-house administrative pro-
ceedings.138 Several empirical studies confirm this trend.139 One explanation 
is that Dodd-Frank, a statutory reform almost coincidental with Morrison, 
has granted the SEC the right to seek civil penalties in administrative pro-
ceedings against any person.140 In the context of this study, another major 
reason is that reporting violations, which represent the bulk of my data, of-
                                                                                                                           
 135 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2018). 
 136 See supra notes 106–110 and infra notes 185–191 and accompanying text. 
 137 Section 10(b) claims are governed by the five-year statute of repose. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 
(2012). 
 138 I reserve judgment on the constitutionality, merits, and demerits of administrative proceed-
ings—the scholarship on this subject is voluminous. For an empirical analysis, see Stephen J. Choi 
& A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2017); see also Engstrom, supra note 42, at 667–68 n.162 (providing an ex-
cellent synopsis of the literature). 
 139 See Choi & Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings, supra note 138; Urska 
Velikonja, Behind the Annual SEC Enforcement Report: 2017 and Beyond 10–12 (Nov. 19, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074073 [https://
perma.cc/8KT4-5PU3]. 
 140 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1; 78u-2 (2016). 
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ten result in the revocation of the registration of securities, and those cases 
are mostly resolved in administrative proceedings.  
To isolate more serious cases, the following graph excludes standalone 
Section 13(a) violations.141 Although more research is needed to examine 
this issue, the preliminary observation is that the Commission has been 
bringing more cases against FPIs in administrative proceedings since 2010. 
Figure 7: Administrative Proceedings and District Court Cases 
 
Administrative proceedings have been, so far, more expedient and nat-
urally cost-effective from the perspective of the SEC.142 The future distribu-
tion of venues, however, is in the hands of the Supreme Court. On January 
12, 2018, the Court granted a writ of certiorari in a case involving a key 
constitutional issue about the ALJ appointment procedure.143 The case may 
scale down the volume of administrative proceedings in the future.144 
Another interesting observation is that in enforcement, the average 
judgments and settlements in the pre- and post-Morrison subsamples were 
comparable against a considerable decrease in settlements and judgments 
against foreign issuers in class-action litigation.145 A typical judgment in an 
                                                                                                                           
 141 This graphic is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
 142 See, e.g., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 116, at 754–71, 773–
802 (reviewing the proceedings). 
 143 Raymond J. Lucia Co. v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).  
 144 For a comprehensive discussion of this case, see, for example, Matthew C. Solomon et al., 
Supreme Court Grants Certiorari on the Constitutionality of SEC ALJ Appointments, PROGRAM ON 
CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 24, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/
2018/01/24/supreme-court-grants-certiorari-on-the-constitutionality-of-sec-alj-appointments-what-
this-means-for-the-securities-industry/ [https://perma.cc/JZH6-8S97] (“Until and unless the Supreme 
Court decides that ALJs are ‘mere employees’ the SEC will continue to bring the bulk of its litigated 
cases in federal courts.”). 
 145 See Guseva, supra note 29, at 255–69. 
2018] SEC & Foreign Private Issuers: Optimal Public Enforcement 2087 
SEC enforcement action, self-evidently, differs in nature from class-action 
judgments and includes a civil penalty, disgorgement of profits, and other 
relief.146 In my dataset, the average settlements in enforcement actions be-
fore the end of June 2010 were about $9 million, and the average settle-
ments after June 2010 were about $9.8 million.  
In calculating the averages, I have excluded (1) settlements that did not 
result in monetary penalties and disgorgement and (2) twelve outliers where 
settlements and judgments exceeded $30 million. The twelve cases that re-
sulted in higher than average penalties were related not to the timing of 
Morrison but instead to the nature and seriousness of the violations. Most of 
the FPI-outliers were charged with FCPA violations.147  
An interesting outlier of considerable notoriety was SEC v. BP p.l.c., re-
sulting in a settlement of $525 million in 2012.148 BP p.l.c., as a foreign private 
issuer, furnished misleading information on Form 6-K concerning the Deep-
water Horizon oil rig explosion in April 2010. Another illustrative example of 
a serious violation that exceeded the average amount of penalties is SEC v. 
Nortel Networks Corporation, et al., a pre-Morrison case involving a fraudu-
lent accounting scheme and resulting in not only an SEC action but also a 
criminal investigation in Canada. The defendant consented to the entry of a 
final judgment and a civil penalty in the amount of $35 million.149 
In search of a possible “complementarity” of public and private en-
forcement, I identified the types of securities in the SEC’s crosshairs and 
classified the FPIs based on the market for their securities as “OTC” and 
“exchange-listed.” Between 2005 and 2016, some companies moved trading 
from an OTC platform to an exchange or from an exchange to an OTC 
market. Those companies were categorized based on their status at the time 
of the respective enforcement actions.150  
                                                                                                                           
 146 See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 147 The outliers included the following FPIs: Siemens Aktiengesellschaft; Technip; Nortel 
Networks Corp.; Credit Suisse AG; Embraer S.A.; ENI S.p.A.; Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 
Ltd.; Total S.A.; ABB Ltd.; Alcatel-Lucent; BP plc; Braskem S.A. 
 148 Litigation Release No. 22531, SEC, BP to Pay $525 Million Penalty to Settle Sec Charges 
of Securities Fraud During Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22531.htm [https://perma.cc/NBR7-LZGU]. 
 149 Litigation Release No. 20333, SEC, Nortel Networks Pays $35 Million to Settle Financial 
Fraud Charges  (Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20333.htm [https://
perma.cc/WG48-U2LY]. 
 150 In several cases involving serious violations and presumably longer investigations, the 
subjects were classified as exchange-traded even when they delisted within two years or less of 
the respective actions. The delisted FPIs were Akzo Nobel N.V.; Azteca Holdings, S.A. de C.V.; 
Bennett Environmental Inc.; Grupo Elektra S.A.; Grupo Iusacell, S.A. de C.V.; Longtop Financial 
Technologies; Lumenis Ltd.; Magyar Telekom; Deutsche Telekom AG; Nordion Inc.; Pharol, 
SGPS, S.A. In all of those cases, the SEC charged the FPIs with violations of the FCPA, violations 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, or serious reporting violations.  
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At first glance, the data seems to suggest that private class actions and 
public enforcement are complements. For instance, in more than ninety per-
cent of private class action complaints filed between 2005 and 2015 under 
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act, plaintiffs overwhelmingly focused on exchange-traded 
securities.151 In contrast, between 2005 and 2016, the SEC targeted more 
companies trading ADRs and shares of stock on the OTC market.152 
Figure 8: Actions Against OTC and Exchange-listed Issuers 
The nature of the penalties, however, belies this superficial conclusion. 
Most actions against OTC issues resulted in the revocation of the registra-
tion of their securities. By contrast, most actions against exchange-traded 
issuers involved more serious charges and produced heavy monetary penal-
ties. Overall, more research is needed to establish (1) whether the Commis-
sion is filling “gaps” in enforcement against foreign OTC issuers as targets 
with lower “visibility” to the plaintiffs’ bar, or (2) whether there is no true 
“complementarity,” and the SEC’s actions are primarily driven by the lower 
costs of prosecuting minor reporting violations. 
This survey was unable to identify clearly defined post-Morrison 
changes except the increase in actions for reporting violations. The results 
suggest that the overarching policies are stable, and that the SEC routinely 
waits for several years before revoking the registration of FPI securities. It 
is possible that, as consistent with prior research, the SEC ordinarily prefers 
a comparatively low-key strategy in enforcement against foreign issuers. 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Guseva, supra note 29, at 267–77. 
 152 Figure 8 is also available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
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III. LOW-KEY ENFORCEMENT AS A DOMINANT STRATEGY 
Several explanations of this enforcement approach are in order. The 
first normative lens of analysis assumes the SEC as a benevolent agency 
concerned about the overdeterrence associated with enforcement against 
foreign issuers. The second and third arguments home in on the institutional 
and international aspects of enforcement. All three arguments ultimately 
suggest that the low-key approach is, using the vernacular of game theo-
rists, the dominant and optimal strategy of the Commission.153 
A. A Benevolent Enforcer 
A benevolent Commission should be aware that the critiques of private 
enforcement of the securities laws are legion. As Part I briefly addresses, 
private attorneys may bring cases whose value is lower than the social cost 
of litigating and target parties which, regardless of their culpability, capitu-
late and concede to settlement demands for fear of the financial and reputa-
tional costs of litigation and massive discovery.154 Any payments to the 
plaintiff class ultimately would come from the pockets of the existing 
shareholders, which is sometimes referred to as the “circularity” problem.155 
These typical critiques are exacerbated by the nature of class-action litiga-
tion against foreign firms, where the plaintiffs’ bar could, at least before 
Morrison, woo foreign plaintiffs to create a “global” class and augment an 
eventual recovery to the class.156 
The SEC is equally aware that overzealous private attorneys may pig-
gyback on its enforcement efforts and bring follow-on cases, which may 
have little value-added from an efficiency perspective.157 Bringing “coat-
                                                                                                                           
 153 In simple terms, “[a] player is said to have a dominant strategy if that same strategy is 
better for him than all of his other available strategies no matter what . . . strategy combination the 
other . . . players choose.” AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY 70 
(2010). 
 154 See Alexander, supra note 52, at 524; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a 
Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 438 (1988); Coffee, supra note 42, at 226–32, 271–72; 
Coffee, supra note 96, at 669–78; Engstrom, supra note 42, at 630–31; Pritchard & Sale, supra 
note 54, at 127; supra notes 42, 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 155 For a thorough discussion of the issue, see, for example, Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 333, 334–35; Merritt B. 
Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WISC. L. 
REV. 297, 303. 
 156 Guseva, supra note 29, at 250–64. 
 157 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 42, at 634 (“[P]rofit-chasing private enforcers will yield 
wasteful duplication of effort and socially costly overdeterrence by ‘piggybacking’ on public en-
forcement efforts and also on each other.”); Rose, supra note 24, at 2201–04, 2220–22. But see 
Clopton, supra note 24, at 288–89; Coffee, supra note 42, at 224–28 (discussing “tag-along” prac-
tices and suggesting that the relationship may be described as “symbiotic”); Howard M. Erichson, 
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tail” actions is comparatively easier for plaintiffs’ attorneys. For instance, in 
some cases, if factual issues have already been litigated between the SEC 
and a foreign defendant and those facts were resolved adversely to the de-
fendant, the defendant may be collaterally estopped from re-litigating the 
same issues in a private action.158 Research suggests that defendants may be 
more likely to promptly settle tagalong private actions.159 This urge to settle 
should emanate, in part, from the expected market penalties of dual pro-
ceedings and an increase in the cost of capital of enforcement targets, “a 
[market] premium to do business with firms that are [presumed] less trust-
worthy.”160 
Aware of these negative externalities and instances of socially wasteful 
private litigation, a benevolent SEC may curb its own actions to achieve a 
more optimal level of deterrence.161 Alternative courses of action may be 
foreclosed because the SEC is powerless against excesses in private litiga-
tion. The Commission cannot, as numerous prominent commentators have 
proposed, monitor private litigation efforts or screen out low-social-value 
cases to ensure optimal enforcement.162 To avoid failing its dual mission of 
                                                                                                                           
Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private 
Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2, 40–49 (2000) (raising important con-
cerns regarding the possibly symbiotic relationship of private litigation and public enforcement). 
 158 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 322 (1979). 
 159 See, e.g., Cox et al., supra note 55, at 777. 
 160 Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 361, 362–66, 371 (2012); see also Choi & 
Pritchard, supra note 23, at 29 (suggesting as an alternative explanation that “[s]tock prices may 
be responding to . . . problems revealed with the firm’s underlying business as much as the loss of 
credibility . . .”); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582, 594–95 (2008). 
 161 For a synoptic review of theory, see, for example, Clopton, supra note 24, at 306; see also 
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 531–34 (1970) (dis-
cussing theories of rational enforcement). “[I]deally, liability should be imposed only in cases 
where, at the margin, the improvement in economic welfare from deterring issuer misstatements is 
at least as great as the social costs arising from prosecuting the action.” Edward G. Fox et al., 
Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 325, 371 (2016); see Becker, supra note 42, at 180–201 (discussing optimal costs 
of enforcement, including the costs of apprehension and conviction, and internalization of the 
costs of misconduct); Rose, supra note 24, at 2189, 2194–95 (suggesting, inter alia, that an en-
forcer may exercise “laudable self-restraint” in cases where significant uncertainty exists). 
 162 For a sample of this rich literature, see, as an example, JENNIFER ARLEN, PUBLIC VERSUS 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD 46 (2007); Engstrom, supra note 42, at 644–55; 
Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 167, 200–01 (1997); Tamar Frankel, Let the Securities and Exchange Commission Out-
source Enforcement by Litigation: A Proposal, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 111, 119–23 (2010); Joseph 
A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The 
Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968–75 (1994); Park, supra note 24, at 174–75; 
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 941–42 (2001); Rose, 
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protecting investors and safeguarding market efficiency,163 a benevolent 
SEC may take a less zealous and more measured enforcement approach. 
In doing so, a benevolent agency will also be protecting the competi-
tiveness of national capital markets and exchanges. The agency is aware 
that an association with the American market, and thereby U.S. regulators, 
is not mandatory for a company domiciled in another jurisdiction. Global 
corporations may access international markets through London or other 
prestigious trading venues serving as alternatives to the NYSE and 
Nasdaq.164 If the projected regulatory and enforcement costs of listing ex-
ceed the expected benefits, an exodus of foreign firms may ensue as foreign 
firms start giving up their American listings. 
The second concern that a rational benevolent enforcer understands is 
that there will be an inevitable information loss between a regulatory agen-
cy and a foreign issuer. An enforcement agency sets its policies in light of 
the estimates of the average costs of reporting and enforcement. A foreign 
issuer, however, must also take into consideration the costs that a regulator 
cannot directly observe. First, international companies hail to the United 
States from jurisdictions with different baseline reporting rules, which im-
plies that some would incur higher costs in the course of cross-listing and 
restructuring their reporting and internal control procedures than others. 
Second, corporations cross-listed on U.S. exchanges may pay higher insur-
ance premiums compared to those of similar firms listed only on home-
country exchanges and may face a higher risk of litigation.165 The SEC can-
not include those outlays in its calculations. 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 52, at 2225; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005). 
 163 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2015). The SEC’s mandate is to stand sentinel protecting investors 
and, at the same time, to guard “fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital for-
mation.” SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 3 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/
about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMR8-KMDH]. 
 164 A database of cross-listed securities is available at BNY Mellon, Depositary Receipts 
https://www.adrbnymellon.com/directory/dr-directory [https://perma.cc/NHF4-REUH]. See Mar-
celo Bianconi & Liang Tan, Cross-Listing Premium in the US and the UK Destination, 19 INT’L 
REV. ECON. & FIN. 244, 246 (2010); Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive 
Than London in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time, 91 J. FIN. 
ECON. 253, 253–55 (2009); Sergei Sarkissian & Michael J. Schill, The Nature of the Foreign 
Listing Premium: A Cross-country Examination, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2494, 2494–95 (2012). 
 165 A suggested explanation is an increased exposure to liability. Stuart L. Gillan & Christine 
A. Panasian, On Litigation Risk and Disclosure Complexity: Evidence from Canadian Firms 
Cross-Listed in the US, 49 INT’L J. ACCT. 426, 427 (2014); see Peter Iliev et al., Uninvited U.S. 
Investors? Economic Consequences of Involuntary Cross-Listing, 52 J. ACCT. RES. 473, 496 
(2014) (suggesting a relationship between the expected risk of litigation and firm value). But see 
Eugene Soltes, Incorporating Field Data into Archival Research, 52 J. ACCT. RES. 521, 524–25 
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A foreign issuer is also more likely than the SEC to determine the indi-
rect costs of enforcement actions and class actions. Those indirect costs 
culminate in reputational penalties, which are levied by the capital market 
with a vengeance and may eclipse direct enforcement costs. Choi and 
Pritchard, for instance, have expanded previous studies by identifying that 
the market penalizes issuers heavily where there is both a class action and a 
Commission investigation and enforcement action against a firm.166 Effec-
tively, the SEC metes out severe punishment not only through the civil pen-
alties, injunctive relief requested in its complaints, or through cease-and-
desist orders, but also through the market and tagalong class actions. While 
the Commission may underestimate the indirect costs of its actions, an indi-
vidual firm may overestimate its risk of liability and projected litigation 
defense costs.167 
This information asymmetry is compounded by the heterogeneity of 
business objectives of international companies pursuing listing in the U.S. 
To name a few examples, one foreign firm may need to use equity consider-
ation in a stock-for-stock merger with a Delaware corporation; another in-
ternational company explores growth opportunities and seeks to tap external 
sources of capital, a move that often follows cross-listing; a third one wants 
to increase international investor exposure; and the management of a fourth 
firm would like to improve liquidity and trading volume and get better fu-
ture analyst coverage, which is associated with more accurate forecasts and 
higher valuations.168 A regulator cannot make allowances for these objec-
tives and equally accommodate all firms in its regulations and enforcement 
actions. An information loss, which is inexorable and permanent, is thus 
created. 
Finally, there is another variable that creates an information gap and 
complicates optimal policy setting. At this juncture, the discussion must pay 
homage to the rich and venerable literatures that argue that the U.S. securi-
ties laws per se and listing on American exchanges generate a “bonding” 
value and trading premiums for foreign firms.169 The overarching idea is 
that firms may objectively benefit from better institutions, adequate disclo-
                                                                                                                           
(2014) (suggesting that in some cases, researchers may overestimate the risk of litigation associat-
ed with cross-listings). 
 166 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 23, at 29–30, 40–45 (discussing the literature). 
 167 See Guseva, supra note 29, at 240–49 (discussing risk aversion, information asymmetry, 
and other relevant arguments). 
 168 Id. at 213–34 (summarizing the extensive literature examining the benefits that foreign 
firms derive from cross-listing). 
 169 Id. at 226–38. 
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sure, investor protection rules, and robust law enforcement in a host juris-
diction such as the United States.170 
Listing decisions are, thus, driven by numerous economic variables in-
corporating not only individual firms’ business objectives but also the ro-
bustness, transparency, and prestige of U.S. capital markets and law.171 
Firms, their executives, and market participants acknowledge that the U.S. 
securities laws and enforcement simultaneously represent costs and offer 
benefits.172 
A benevolent public enforcer, thus, should bear in mind (a) the ineffi-
ciencies of private class actions and (b) the information losses resulting 
from the heterogeneity of foreign firms’ business objectives, costs of list-
ings, and reputational penalties of enforcement actions. These factors 
should shepherd the SEC to low-key prosecutorial policies. 
A benevolent Commission, however, would not neglect its investor 
protection objective. After all, as Easterbrook and Fischel famously 
quipped, “[a] world with fraud . . . is a world with too little investment.”173 
Hence, the SEC would search for substitutes for local enforcement. An ex-
ample of a functional substitute is cooperation with regulators in the coun-
tries of domicile of international issuers. Decades of SEC initiatives lend 
support to this argument. The Commission has been increasingly relying on 
cooperation with foreign regulators through not only technical assistance 
but also enforcement and supervisory coordination. It has forged bilateral 
dialogues with regulators around the globe,174 assisted foreign regulators in 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See generally John Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings 
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757 (2002); Guseva, supra note 29, at 222–38 (discussing legal bonding); René M. Stulz, Securi-
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ACCT. RES. 349, 367–75 (2009) (discussing the role of securities laws); Licht et al., supra note 84, 
at 2–4 (discussing bonding and other related hypotheses and the impact of enforcement). 
 171 Guseva, supra note 29, at 222–34. 
 172 Howell E. Jackson, Summary of Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application of 
Federal Securities Law, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009, at 
1243, 1255 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1743, 2009); see Louis 
Gagnon & G. Andrew Karolyi, An Unexpected Test of the Bonding Hypothesis, THE REVIEW OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE STUDIES, VOL. 7 (2018), at 103–108 ( summarizing the literature and de-
scribing the effect of Morrison);  Fan He & Chinmoy Ghosh, The Diminishing Benefits of U.S. 
Cross-Listing: Economic Consequences of SEC Rule 12h-6, 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALY-
SIS 1143, (June 15, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000254 [https://perma.cc/ZAS4-
ZQ5V] (examining the relationship between the commitment to the U.S. legal system and bonding 
premiums). 
 173 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984). 
 174 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC and CESR Launch Work Plan Focused on Financial 
Reporting: Developing Cross Atlantic Financial Markets (Aug. 2, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2006/2006-130.htm [https://perma.cc/4LYY-N4D2]; Press Release, SEC, SEC and CSRC 
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their investigations,175 engaged in information sharing with foreign authori-
ties, and signed bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding, in-
cluding memoranda with the IOSCO, which currently has as many as 118 
signatories,176 and with individual national regulators.177 
B. A Rational Bureaucratic Enforcer 
Against this optimistic view of the SEC as a benevolent agency lies a 
second perspective: a picture of an SEC acting as a rational utility maximiz-
er instigated to limit its enforcement against foreign corporations by politi-
cal and institutional benefits as well as the utility functions of the SEC 
staff.178 Consider first the career prospects of the staff. To some attorneys, 
walking through the “revolving door” and capitalizing on their agency ex-
perience through the bounties of private practice may be important motiva-
tions.179 
I am not insinuating that government attorneys shirk their responsibili-
ties currying favor with enforcement targets—the reality is quite the oppo-
site.180 Instead, public choice arguments are more nuanced. Some staff 
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 175 See International Enforcement Assistance: SEC Framework for International Cooperation 
and Assistance, SEC (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml 
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 176 See IOSCO MMoU: Appendix A (current signatories)—118, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.
org/about/?subSection=mmou&subSection1=signatories [https://perma.cc/7T37-T24H ]. 
 177 See generally, e.g., SEC ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CON-
SULTATION, COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SUPERVI-
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have joined the Memorandum since 2010. Id. 
 178 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 42, at 621 (observing that “[a]gencies may simply lack the 
capacity to accurately gauge case merits, or they may privilege pursuit of political rewards over 
welfare-maximizing regulation of private enforcement efforts”); Rose, supra note 24, at 2216–17 
(discussing personal considerations of agency employees). 
 179 See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 53, at 887–94; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1105, 1115–16 (1995). 
 180 Many staff members are highly ethical attorneys simply doing their job. Research also 
shows that, on average, lawyers are “anxious to show their ability to promote their job prospects.” 
Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
4 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-07, 2017), https://repository.law.
umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1238&context=law_econ_current; see Donald C. Lange-
voort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1621 (2006) (discussing external and internal agency motivations); 
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members might prefer to steer enforcement decisions in a direction that 
would correspond to their career objectives and, for instance, focus on cer-
tain strata of violations and firms that could be useful for their resumes or 
become employers or clients in the future.181 If foreign firms were less like-
ly to fall within these categories, such staff members would be less interest-
ed in those targets, unless, for the sake of the argument, they were planning 
to immigrate, there were public evidence and indicia of fraud, or an interna-
tional firm had large operations within the U.S. 
This argument skips right off the bat the ascendant “regulatory cap-
ture” theories. Regardless of the underlying probability of capture as an in-
stitutional phenomenon,182 the capture by dispersed foreign corporations 
hailing from multiple jurisdictions seems unlikely. Even though foreign 
firms may systematically benefit from lower enforcement costs, the collec-
tive action problem would prevent coordinated lobbying on behalf of dis-
persed foreign corporations. They simply do not represent a coherent orga-
nized group.183 On balance, the personal benefits of career advancement and 
utility functions of the SEC staff may be a more useful lens of analysis. 
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(surveying competing views on regulatory agencies and employment considerations). 
 182 On the uncertainties and theoretical limitations, see, for example, Daniel Carpenter, De-
tecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 57, 57–58 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013); 
Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7–8, 106–08 (2000); 
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and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701 (2017); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC 
at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1089–90, 1099–102 (2005); Jona-
than R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate 
Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 958 
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 183 That is not to say that an individual firm would not benefit from lobbying. Indeed, there is 
evidence that corporate lobbying is correlated with lower fraud detection by regulators. See, e.g., 
Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 1865, 1865–68 (2011). 
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This discussion also does not imply that the SEC purposely avoids 
meritorious cases. As Roberta Karmel emphasized, “[i]t is psychologically 
and politically difficult to decline to institute a case involving bad facts or to 
accept a questionable settlement.” 184 Before “bad facts” become known, 
however, a target must be chosen and thoroughly investigated. These junc-
tions often depend on the staff. 
Most importantly, the personal utility arguments are entwined with in-
stitutional benefits. To an agency constantly forced to advertise its enforce-
ment successes, the argument raised in Section II(B),185 domestic cases pro-
vide more bang for the buck. Some scholars also suggest that domestic en-
forcement generates better press and publicity compared to cases against 
foreign defendants.186 Furthermore, regulators, including the SEC, some-
times exhibit caution, a tendency suggested in the literature on the regulato-
ry state187 and confirmed by a 2013 study by the Government Accountabil-
ity Office.188 The SEC and its staff may purposely avoid complicated inter-
national cases where the costs of investigations are high and the resultant 
success on the merits is questionable.189 Incidentally, it is possible that the 
resource-constrained and risk-averse SEC is not “filling the gaps” in private 
enforcement against international corporations but rather pounces on small-
                                                                                                                           
 184 Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The Law-
yer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (1998). 
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note 42, at 680. 
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er respondents190 and simple reporting violations to avoid failure. The ten-
dency to avoid complicated cases and powerful opponents is not unprece-
dented—foreign regulators have followed similar strategies.191 
To summarize, the low-key enforcement against foreign firms is Janus-
faced. The SEC may be acting as a benevolent, social-welfare-maximizing 
enforcer or as an institution whose policies are premised on self-advertising, 
risk aversion, staff’s personal utility functions, and budget-related issues; all 
explaining the agency’s case selection strategies. The choice is not binary 
and both explanations have merit. 
C. Specifics of International Enforcement 
Regardless of the underlying motivations of the SEC, it has opted for 
the best strategy of low-key enforcement. Each cross-listed company faces 
a two-by-two enforcement matrix including at least two national enforce-
ment agencies and at least two sets of national courts. Consider an example 
of a Canadian company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and on 
Nasdaq and having about fifty percent of its assets on either side of the 
U.S.-Canadian border. Just as the United States has an efficient private en-
forcement system, Canada does as well. Both jurisdictions obviously have 
public enforcers. This is an example of a two-by-two matrix with at least 
two venues for private enforcement and at least two public enforcers. With-
in this matrix, each national policymaker is unable to design procedural 
rules that would minimize the total net social costs of fraud and of en-
forcement.192 No single country can singlehandedly achieve an optimal lev-
el of enforcement against an international firm unless the other jurisdiction 
openly imposes restrictions on its own enforcement policy. 
Yet no national regulator would openly commit to a hands-off ap-
proach, which is akin to freeriding and shirking its responsibilities to protect 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Cox et al., supra note 55, at 778 (discussing this tendency); Engstrom, supra note 42, at 
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investors and oversee all issuers registered with the regulator. The regulator, 
for instance, would easily foresee a likely public backlash following an of-
ficial announcement of a low-enforcement strategy.193 
To avoid this problem, the regulators within the international enforce-
ment “matrix” can cooperate, of course. Cooperation, however, varies 
among enforcement agencies, and international enforcement rules are diffi-
cult to make effective.194 For instance, the Ontario Securities Commission 
may take the lead in a specific case, and the SEC would provide support in 
that joint investigation. In case there are parallel class actions in Canada and 
the United States, courts may split the plaintiff class for the purposes of set-
tlement.195 The international two-by-two enforcement matrix between the 
two neighbors would work well in that individual case. By contrast, in the 
case of some other countries, even if there is a broad umbrella agreement or 
a bilateral MOU, the SEC’s coordination costs could be much higher or 
even prohibitive.196 Each time the Division of Enforcement calls on foreign 
regulators for assistance in its investigations, the SEC, as an institution, 
cashes in on its political capital for the purposes of a specific investigation 
and related discovery. Just as political capital is limited, so too is interna-
tional cooperation in enforcement. The SEC must prioritize. 
In addition, international requests for assistance may take time. Recall 
the Supreme Court’s new position on the application of the statute of limita-
tion to disgorgement in SEC cases.197 This doctrinal change should further 
dampen the Commission’s incentives to engage in a cross-border dialogue 
with foreign bureaucracies whenever time is of essence.198 
The second consideration demonstrating why the current SEC’s policy 
is the dominant strategy is grounded in political economy. Recall that ac-
cording to the bonding theory, cross-listings are associated, inter alia, with 
trading premiums, better reporting, better access to capital, and corporate 
governance improvements.199 Those benefits would not be concentrated in 
the United States alone. To the extent that the benefits are associated with 
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 199 See supra notes 168–170. 
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SEC enforcement actions, the Commission, as a national regulator, would 
be spending its limited budget on subsidizing foreign markets and regula-
tors. The SEC’s regulatory actions would generate a global positive exter-
nality. 
Hence, the SEC is likely to either ignore certain cases or refer some 
matters to its counterparts abroad instead of actually prosecuting foreign 
issuers.200 It is those foreign regulators—not the SEC—that operate as pri-
mary regulators of foreign corporations, have better access to evidence 
about wrongdoings, and naturally should assume the costs of enforcement 
and prosecute securities fraud in their respective jurisdictions.201 Absent 
specific policy reasons, such as, for instance, the importance of a cross-
listed company to American economy or ownership of substantial assets in 
one country, i.e., the circumstances in which the issuer inches closer to the 
“domestic” company status,202 a rational enforcer would not want to absorb 
the costs of cross-border investigation and enforcement. 
This philosophy is also indirectly embedded in the Commission’s En-
forcement Manual, which guides the Enforcement Division toward “matters 
having potential programmatic significance, which are deemed ‘National 
Priority Matters.’”203 Among the criteria that carry weight with the En-
forcement Division are a strong message of deterrence and substantial num-
bers of injured investors.204 Foreign companies and the magnitude of related 
investor losses may easily fall outside of these “matters of national signifi-
cance” and be relegated to the targets of marginal importance.205 
The third supporting argument is premised on the public choice expla-
nations discussed in Section B. As a national regulator, the Commission 
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would not capture the full benefits from enforcement. Its actions, associated 
with better deterrence or more competitive and transparent markets, would 
be a pure “unrequited subsidy” to public agencies and markets in other ju-
risdictions. These global “subsidies,” undoubtedly, would not be assigned to 
the personnel of the SEC.206 In contrast, the underlying enforcement actions 
may galvanize the critics of the Commission if, for instance, there is an out-
flow of foreign firms to exchanges outside the United States. The SEC, 
thus, bears the risks of deterring foreign issuers from listing, reducing the 
competitiveness of U.S. markets, and being blamed for the exodus of inter-
national companies.207 Overdeterrence, in turn, impedes capital formation 
and reduces allocative efficiency. 
To summarize, the foregoing issues are bound to produce only one 
dominant strategy for the SEC—a predictably low enforcement and high 
discretionary nonenforcement. The cross-border enforcement ecology itself 
logically pushes the SEC to rely on regulators abroad and private enforcers 
within the United States. The SEC, thus, may reasonably view private liti-
gation not only as “a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement”208 but also 
as an institutionally preferable optimum option. The SEC should rationally 
invest less in enforcement against foreign firms compared to enforcement 
against domestic corporations. Since the Commission cannot publicly admit 
its philosophy, this dominant strategy remains unacknowledged. 
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IV. IS LOW-KEY ENFORCEMENT SUSTAINABLE? 
A. Class Actions 
This Part examines whether this policy needs to be adjusted in the 
post-Morrison world.209 The analysis below provides a synoptic review of 
the changes in class-action litigation, firms’ incentives, and market trends. 
In terms of litigation, Morrison, despite concerns of some commentators,210 
has not dealt a deathblow to class actions against international compa-
nies.211 Even the SEC itself, in the 2012 Study mandated by Dodd-Frank, 
hesitated to recommend that Congress take action to overrule Morrison.212 
Yet, it is also true that Morrison has affected litigation in multiple 
ways.213 By way of example, the Morrison decision may have strengthened 
the defendants’ hand at early stages in litigation. Most claims are usually 
settled after an unsuccessful motion to dismiss. More rarely, defendants set-
tle after class certification. In its July 7, 2017, Petrobras decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Morrison, vacated in part a class certi-
fication order and remanded the case for further proceedings on the grounds 
that the lower court did not determine whether the question of the domestic 
nature of the OTC transactions at issue would predominate over the issues 
of law and fact common to the whole class.214  
The Morrison decision also seems to have opened some unexpected 
avenues for avoiding Securities Act litigation. For instance, Joseph Grund-
fest points out that the Court has missed that, in addition to secondary mar-
ket liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Morrison, ex hypothesi, 
reduces Section 11 liability in initial public offerings “in which listing on a 
U.S. exchange follows an initial distribution that includes even a small 
                                                                                                                           
 209 Paraphrasing Amanda Rose, is SEC’s “prosecutorial discretion [against foreign issuers] 
palatable [and can] the enforcer . . . be trusted to promote optimal deterrence” by staying on a 
course of predictably low enforcement? Rose, supra note 24, at 2197. 
 210 See, e.g., STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE, supra note 32, at 18–19, 39, 42–53; 
Licht et al., supra note 84, at 5 (citing comments submitted by twenty-six pension funds to the 
SEC); Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors 
Deserve Their Day in Court (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2012-
spch041112laahtm [https://perma.cc/A4GL-KFMA] (“It is clear that Morrison has deprived inves-
tors of their private rights of action under the Exchange Act with respect to a wide range of poten-
tially fraudulent conduct that the United States has a compelling interest to regulate.”). 
 211 Although theoretically plausible, this scenario is not fully supported by research and data 
on current filings. See Guseva, supra note 29, at 254–79; Licht et al., supra note 84, at 17, 25–26. 
 212 STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE, supra note 32, at 58–70. 
 213 See Guseva, supra note 29, at 249–78. 
 214 In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e next hold that the district 
court committed legal error by finding that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement was satis-
fied without considering the need for individual Morrison inquiries regarding domestic transac-
tions. We therefore vacate this portion of Certification Order.”). 
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number of shares sold in transactions that are non-domestic under Morri-
son.”215 More importantly, there is a chance that if foreign purchasers, who 
acquire shares in non-domestic transactions, later on sell their securities on 
an American exchange, the sales will contaminate the whole pool of securi-
ties, including those originally purchased in domestic transactions. All 
shares will be commingled and may become “tainted.” This will prevent 
U.S. aftermarket purchasers from satisfying the tracing requirement, i.e., the 
requirement that “aftermarket purchasers seeking standing must demon-
strate the ability to ‘trace’ their shares to the faulty registration”216 state-
ment. Consequently, Morrison represents an approach to extraterritoriality 
that may shake the foundations of the nearly century-old liability regime 
under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. 
There also were some post-Morrison changes that may point toward 
reduced risks in class-action litigation in general. Even though class action 
filings against international companies have been rising for a few years,217 
after 2010, foreign issuers face a smaller plaintiff class because federal dis-
trict courts dismissed all actions brought by foreign and U.S. residents with 
respect to securities purchased abroad.218 Post-Morrison mean and median 
class action settlements became lower by almost sixty percent. After Morri-
son, more class action settlements were in the range between $1 million and 
$5 million, and a higher percentage of post-Morrison claims settled.219 
More post-Morrison defendants preferred to settle quickly, before a court 
ruling on a motion to dismiss or without ever moving to dismiss, which is 
their primary and cheapest weapon in securities class-action litigation.220 
It is, of course, possible that international corporate defendants were 
motivated to settle because of the need to avoid litigation costs and distrac-
                                                                                                                           
 215 Joseph A. Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, 
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tion. See, e.g., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITI-
GATION: 2016 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 7 (2017), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/
2017/PUB_2016_Securities_Year-End_Trends_Report_0117.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG5V-GDTL]. 
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tion of class actions or simply due to risk aversion.221 In this sense, post-
Morrison defendants may perceive the risk of going to trial as more daunt-
ing compared with a cheaper prompt settlement. Unfortunately, an alterna-
tive explanation could be an increase in fraud222 and higher net benefits 
from fraud resulting from suboptimal deterrence. To conclude, although it is 
false to presume that more post-Morrison settling defendants are lemons, 
the reverse cannot be ruled out without additional research. 
B. Post-Morrison Investors 
Another concern is that through listing on exchanges, foreign compa-
nies improve their international visibility, proceed to issue more securities, 
and arouse broad investor interest.223 When an American investor learns 
about a foreign company being listed on the NYSE with all the attendant 
fanfare, she may be more interested in acquiring its securities, proceed with 
placing a purchase order with her broker, and, should the broker execute the 
order on a foreign exchange in the country of domicile of the cross-listed 
issuer, fully appreciate the consequences of her decision only too late. 
Namely, if the international issuer published materially misleading state-
ments, that investor would be unable to bring an action for fraud under the 
federal securities laws in a U.S. court. 
Admittedly, these consequences of Morrison may be limited to indi-
viduals. In contrast, institutional investors are presumed more sophisticated 
and well-diversified. Yet, they are not immune from being blindsided by 
fraudsters and bamboozled by the prestige of listing in the United States. In 
fact, institutions investing in foreign companies may prefer securities of 
cross-listed issuers.224 Research indicates, however, that many institutional 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Another possible factor predetermining litigation behavior is D&O insurance. See, e.g., 
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 222 Pritchard & Sale, supra note 54, at 128. 
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supra note 92, at 117–18, 122, 132, 137; Michael R. King & Dan Segal, The Long-Term Effects of 
Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2393, 2394–96 (2009); Reese & Weisbach, supra note 70, at 67–73, 102; Ryan T. Ball et al., Eq-
uity Cross-Listings in the U.S. and the Price of Debt 3–4, 16–17 (European Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 274/2010, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
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investors did not change their investment and trading policies in the wake of 
Morrison225—investors continued to purchase foreign issuers’ securities 
through transactions that fell outside the extraterritorial reach of the securi-
ties laws. Institutions either have ignored the judicial “about-face” in their 
trading strategies or, instead of looking to possible litigation, relied on vari-
ous economic factors, including improvements in disclosure and the in-
formativeness of share prices, which are characteristic consequences of 
cross-listings.226 
At the same time, recent research warns that Morrison may have pro-
duced a negative impact not only on investor litigation but also on corporate 
reporting, private benefits of control, and transparency.227 Moreover, even 
though improvements in corporate governance and reporting ensue after 
cross-listings,228 these effects are not uniform, and there are significant 
country-level effects associated with the strength of local investor protec-
tion rules and their enforcement.229 Depending on the extent of the reduc-
tion in post-Morrison disclosure and private enforcement, even institutional 
investors may need help from the Commission. 
C. Good and Bad Firms 
A 2010 study suggested that private enforcement alone, although not 
useless for fraud prevention, was responsible for only three percent of the 
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detected cases of fraud, while the SEC accounted for seven percent.230 Post-
Morrison, i.e., after 2010, foreign companies may come to believe that 
against a stable level of public enforcement of the antifraud provisions of 
the securities laws, fraud detection has become even lower. A litigation risk 
reduction inures to the benefit of honest international firms. Unfortunately, 
it simultaneously benefits companies that are more likely to under-comply 
and commit fraud.231 
Fraud primarily improves the payoffs of culpable corporate insiders.232 
Those insiders may safely reside in foreign countries, which raises personal 
jurisdiction, investigatory and enforcement obstacles,233 and enjoy private 
benefits, which typically should be negatively associated with the greater 
transparency accompanying cross-listings.234  
This problem becomes particularly acute when a firm intends to exit a 
market. If a firm is ready to leave U.S. markets—when, for instance, it has 
raised the necessary capital after cross-listing, which is generally associated 
with an uptick in securities offerings,235 or where the firm has nothing fur-
ther to gain from having securities traded in the United States—its control 
persons may take on more risk or engage in fraudulent practices in this final 
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period. Fraud becomes a positive net value project in the final period.236 A 
manager’s expected return on fraud, materially misleading statements, or 
simply dishonest puffery, is inversely related to the expected costs of law 
and enforcement. 
In extreme circumstances, if an under-deterrence scenario is severe and 
left unaddressed for a long time, a lemons market may ensue.237 In that 
market, rational investors would increasingly and continuously discount the 
value of publicly traded securities of all foreign issuers regardless of wheth-
er an individual issuer is an honest international corporation or a lemon.238 
The honest foreign issuers would not receive a premium for their truthful 
corporate reporting and could be penalized with a lower market price and 
more strike suits if they candidly disclosed news, particularly, bad news, to 
shareholders. Ultimately, they would be forced to exit American markets.239 
This outcome would defeat the objectives of national securities regulation, 
including improved disclosure, share price accuracy, corporate transparen-
cy, and ultimately, allocative efficiency.240 
D. Troublesome Market Examples 
There is, obviously, no urgent lemons problem presently plaguing the 
U.S. market. Yet, a few recent trends are worthy of note. Around 2015, the 
major American exchanges—the NYSE and Nasdaq—overtook London, 
which has traditionally been their major competitor in attracting cross-
listings through depositary receipts.241 Another statistic comes from the da-
tabase of reporting FPIs registered with the SEC. Their numbers were slow-
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ly dropping for several decades but have stabilized recently.242 This means 
that the outflow of international firms has slowed down, even if it has not 
been entirely reversed. 
Is this because the United States finally has struck the right balance in 
terms of the costs and benefits of listing, the attendant exposure to its liabil-
ity regime, and compliance costs?243 How many of the currently cross-listed 
issuers are lemons? And how many are less committed to abide by the law 
and ensure good corporate practices because of a possible erosion of such 
corporate governance device as class actions?244 Some studies, for instance, 
suggest that companies already tend to disclose less information to the mar-
ket in the wake of Morrison.245  
Consider also the distribution of domiciles of the international compa-
nies currently registered with the SEC. It is broad and spans strong and suc-
cessful markets, as well as jurisdictions with weaker capital markets and 
securities law. Yet, the following offshore jurisdictions top the lists as of 
December 31, 2015, and December 31, 2011, but not as of December 31, 
2006: 
•  British Virgin Islands (BVI) had thirty-seven and fifty-three regis-
tered and reporting companies in 2015 and 2011, respectively, but as 
few as twenty-one in 2006; 
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•  Cayman Islands companies increased their presence as well, with 
119 and 134 companies in 2015 and 2011, respectively, and only forty-
three in 2006; 
•  Marshal Islands stand at forty-five and thirty-two issuers in 2015 and 
2011, respectively, and only fifteen in 2006.246 
About a third of BVI-domiciled companies’ securities trade on the 
OTC market. Other issuers within the foregoing group are almost equally 
split between the two most reputable listing venues—the NYSE and 
Nasdaq. Apparently, American investors and exchanges are not deterred by 
the fact that foreign issuers are registered offshore. 
An apt illustration is Alibaba, which is listed in New York.247 Alibaba’s 
complicated ownership and governance structures were not welcome in 
Hong Kong. The unsuccessful overtures to Hong Kong’s Stock Exchange 
were among the reasons that led to Alibaba’s listing on a United States ex-
change.248 Some companies may attempt to avoid the stringency of their 
domestic regulations or exchange requirements, “escape” to the United 
States,249 and enjoy the historical prestige and liquidity of U.S. exchanges. 
Overall, a growing number of reporting firms hail from offshore juris-
dictions. 250 
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Figure 9: International Registered and Reporting Companies, 2005-2016 
Another troubling fact was a recent uptick in notorious “reverse mer-
gers,” a merger practice where surviving companies were ostensibly domes-
tic, but, de facto, became foreign-controlled issuers. The wave of reverse 
mergers ultimately prompted the SEC to approve a new rule requiring, inter 
alia, that U.S. exchanges monitor reverse-merger companies more closely.251 
Litigation against offshore and reverse-merger companies poses unique 
challenges, and aggrieved investors are left with practically no recourse. In 
the course of my previous research on class actions filed between 2005 and 
2015, I found a number of default judgments against offshore companies 
and against companies listed on American exchanges through reverse mer-
gers.  Many of them had ultimately become insolvent.252 My database in-
cluded at least twelve post-Morrison default judgments, eight of which 
were related to reverse merger companies, and only one default judgment in 
a case filed before Morrison. Instead of showing up in court, those compa-
nies preferred to walk away.253 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves New Rules to Toughen Listing Standards for 
Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PLY3-EGY6]. 
 252 See., e.g., Order Staying Case as to Defendant Jiangbo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Upon Sug-
gestion of Bankruptcy, Lagace v. Jiangbo Pharm., Inc., No. 1:11CV22556 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 
2013); Dena Aubin & Tracy Rucinski, ChinaCast Files for Bankruptcy to Pursue Embezzlement 
Claims, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/chinacast-bankruptcy-idUSL1
N1DB2ID [https://perma.cc/2FSU-92SV]. 
 253 See infra Appendix II (summarizing post-Morrison cases that resulted in a default judgment 
or produced similar outcomes). The list is part of the database prepared in the course of my research 
on class-action litigation. See Guseva, supra note 29. Appendix II is also available at http://www.bc.
edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-6/guseva-graphics.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VNL6-QQ2P]. 
2110 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2055 
E. Conclusion 
It is not an objective of this Article to suggest or to demonstrate that 
nomadic offshore and foreign hordes are hell-bent on ripping off unsuspect-
ing American investors and target U.S. markets because of a lower risk of 
class-action litigation post-Morrison. Instead, my purpose is to show that 
within the global market, with a new status quo in private enforcement, 
some American investors may more easily fall prey to foreign fraudsters. 
Whenever a firm’s pre-commitment to good behavior is low and whenever 
deterrence provided by a liability regime, including both public and private 
enforcement, is inadequate, more low-quality firms may use that opportuni-
ty to their benefit. 
Taking into account the predicates delineated in Part III, it is also logi-
cal to imagine how in extreme circumstances the international enforcement 
milieu may be eroded by “the tragedy of the commons.”254 When a compa-
ny cross-lists its securities in the United States, the market reacts positively, 
in part because cross-listings ordinarily signal firms’ reputation, transparen-
cy, and commitment to better practices and legal institutions.255 Not only the 
market, but also the regulators, equally may view cross-listings as a quality 
signal. It is plausible that some foreign agencies, aware that the Commis-
sion is deemed the most active enforcement agency in terms of its financial 
inputs and enforcement outputs,256 may be tempted to lighten their own 
oversight and possibly freeride on the expected Commission enforcement. 
As Part III indicates, however, there are few reasons why that enforcement 
should be forthcoming. 
In a hypothetical scenario where the enforcement underinvestment be-
came mutual, investors in international issuers would represent a proverbial 
common pasture where corporate fraudsters could roam free and no single 
regulator, particularly, not the SEC, would have sufficient incentives to pro-
vide oversight. If, simultaneously, private class-action litigation was ham-
strung by procedural rules, the relative costs of fraud would decrease below 
a socially optimal level. If the costs are low, more international firms, in-
cluding both “oranges” and “lemons,” may be enticed to list to enjoy the 
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benefits of cross-listing in a market such as the United States.257 What 
should the SEC do to keep potential international fraudsters in check and, at 
the same time, to control the costs of cross-listings to avoid deterring honest 
firms? 
V. A DOCTRINAL INQUIRY: CAN THE SEC ACT? 
This Part embarks on this inquiry by reviewing first the relevant doc-
trinal issues and determining whether the post-Morrison SEC has the neces-
sary tools and incentives to proceed more aggressively. In other words, has 
Morrison restricted the SEC’s ability and willingness to prosecute foreign 
companies, just as it has limited the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud 
provisions of the securities laws in class actions? 
To date, there remains an ambiguity as to the restraints on the Com-
mission’s ability to prosecute foreign firms. Because the Court intended the 
restrictions on the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) to apply 
broadly, Morrison did not carve out an explicit exception for public en-
forcement purposes. Following Newton’s third law, the Supreme Court’s 
action caused an instantaneous reaction from Congress. A congressional 
committee approved Dodd-Frank almost immediately after Morrison. In 
fact, the conference committee had its last meeting on June 24, 2010,258 the 
day when the Supreme Court issued Morrison. The ultimate statutory lan-
guage provides that district courts have jurisdiction of actions brought by 
the Department of Justice and the SEC involving:  
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transac-
tion occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign 
investors; or 
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foresee-
able substantial effect within the United States.259 
Despite this strong language, the statute does not comport with Morri-
son. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that “to ask what conduct 
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§ 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits 
question,”260 Congress has used the jurisdictional phraseology.261 
There is a spectrum of lower court decisions running the gamut from 
the strict pro-Morrison presumption against extraterritoriality on the one 
side, to uncertain doctrinal construction in the middle, and all the way to 
pro-SEC conclusions. The first group appears small. By way of example, in 
Vilar, the Second Circuit examined and underscored the general “presump-
tion that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the 
world.”262 In the middle are those who share awareness that there is no con-
sensus on whether Dodd-Frank has overruled Morrison for purposes of pub-
lic enforcement. Those courts have been very circumspect in addressing this 
issue and declined to resolve the matter.263 
For instance, in Battoo, the Northern District of Illinois Court dodged a 
bullet in 2016, observing that it was “not necessary to decide whether Sec-
tion 929P(b) does indeed overrule Morrison for actions brought by the SEC, 
because the Court concludes that Section 929P(b) does not apply retroac-
tively to any pre-Dodd-Frank enactment conduct, which makes up the bulk 
of the alleged conduct committed by [defendant].”264 The court proceeded 
to apply Morrison and found find that “[g]iven that at least some investors 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010). 
 261 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, MORRISON AT FOUR: A SURVEY OF 
ITS IMPACT ON SECURITIES LITIGATION 14 (2014), http://xbma.org/forum/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/Morrison-at-Four-A-Survey-of-Its-Impact-on-Securities-Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WFM6-AEXU]. 
 262 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013). The court also extended Morrison to criminal cases. Id. at 
70–72, 98. The case involved an appeal of the judgments of conviction, which were entered in 
February and predated Morrison and Dodd-Frank. 
 263 See, e.g., SEC v. Sabrdaran, 252 F. Supp. 3d 866, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The SEC has 
established that the spread bets that IG Index actually hedged fall within Morrison’s reach because 
securities were purchased in the U.S. by IG Index's broker. Because, once again, the evidence here 
meets even Morrison’s stricter test, the Court need not address the parties’ dispute over whether 
Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank revived the broader tests that Morrison rejected.”); id. at 895 n.6 
(“The Court need not stake a position in that debate, as the hedged spread bets meet the Morrison 
test. The Court likewise declines to decide whether Morrison only applies to private rights of 
action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and not SEC enforcement actions, as 
some courts have concluded.”); SEC v. Battoo, 158 F. Supp. 3d 676, 692–94 (N.D. Ill. 2016); 
SEC v. Brown, No. 14 C 6130, 2015 WL 1010510, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2015) (“This Court, 
consistent with Chicago Convention Center, concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve at this time 
the difficult question of the Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on Morrison. The SEC alleges that the par-
ties incurred irrevocable liability in the United States.”); SEC v. Sabrdaran, No. 14-CV-04825-
JSC, 2015 WL 901352, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015); SEC. v. Funinaga, No. 213-CV-1658 
JCM CWH, 2014 WL 4977334, at *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2014); SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., 
LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908–17 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 264 Battoo, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 692 (footnotes omitted). 
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incurred irrevocable liability in the United States, the transactions at issue 
were ‘domestic transactions’ under Morrison.”265 
In another case, the same district court, cognizant of the complexity, 
“conclude[d] that it [was] unnecessary to resolve at this time the difficult 
question of the Dodd–Frank Act’s impact on Morrison.”266 The Northern 
District of California Court decided to follow a similarly safe route, looked 
to the Morrison test, and concluded that “[i]n light of the Court’s decision 
that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently meet the transactional test, 
it need not resolve the debate over whether the Dodd–Frank Act overruled 
Morrison, as the SEC contends.”267 
Even when courts alluded to the substantive, i.e., not merely jurisdic-
tional, nature of the Dodd-Frank amendments, they refrained from defini-
tively resolving the issue. In Chicago Convention Ctr., the court in 2013, for 
example, examined “[the] tension created by Section 929P(b), namely that 
the plain language of the Section 929P(b) seems purely jurisdictional—
particularly in light of its placement in the jurisdictional section of the Ex-
change Act—yet the Congressional intent behind that provision supports a 
conclusion that the provision is substantive.”268 The court acknowledged 
that its analysis of the plain language of the statute could be incomplete and 
that “it is possible that this interpretation would create superfluity or con-
tradict the legislative intent.”269 In the end, the court equivocated again and 
was spared further inquiry because the SEC’s complaint could also safely 
survive under the new Morrison test.270 
At the other end of this case-law spectrum are courts such as the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York that are markedly less cau-
tious. Those courts occasionally have stretched the holding in Morrison to 
cover foreign transactions271 and seem to have acknowledged that Dodd-
Frank has reversed Morrison in public enforcement. For instance, in Gruss, 
the court in 2012 observed that “[e]ntitled ‘Strengthening Enforcement by 
the Commission,’ Section 929P(b) amends the Securities Act, the Exchange 
Act, and the [Investment Advisers Act (IAA)] to allow the SEC or the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Id. at 694. 
 266 Brown, 2015 WL 1010510, at *5. 
 267 Sabrdaran, 2015 WL 901352, at *14. 
 268 A Chi. Convention Ctr., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 910. 
 269 Id. at 916. 
 270 See id. at 916–17. 
 271 In Maillard, for instance, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
observed that although the defendant did not trade in listed securities, the chain of transactions 
involved purchases of contracts-for-difference in Luxembourg. In turn, this caused an investment 
firm to acquire securities that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. SEC v. Maillard, No. 
13-cv-5299, 2014 WL 1660024, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014). 
2114 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2055 
Justice Department to commence civil and criminal enforcement actions 
extraterritorially in certain cases. Therefore, Section 929P(b) restores the 
SEC’s extraterritorial authority over the IAA and its passage suggests that 
Congress intended for the extraterritorial application of the IAA . . . .”272  
Finally, as recently as March 28, 2017, the District Court for the 
District of Utah unambiguously stated that Congress intended that the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities law apply extraterritorially under the 
broader conduct and effects tests.273 The court granted the SEC’s motion for 
preliminary injunction. At the same time, it immediately certified the order 
for interlocutory appeal and emphasized that there was “‘substantial ground 
for difference of opinion’ as to whether . . . Dodd-Frank reinstated the con-
duct and effects test for litigation brought by the SEC.”274  
One of more academic points of contention in this opinion is its re-
liance on context and legislative history,275 the references that the redoubta-
ble late Justice Scalia doubtless would have scorned. For instance, in de-
termining the purpose of the amendment, the court examined its context and 
the temporal association between the time of drafting such omnibus bill as 
Dodd-Frank and Morrison—a judicial decision concerning one single provi-
sion of this voluminous statute.276  
                                                                                                                           
 272 SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (footnotes omitted); see SEC v. 
Tourre, No. 10 CIV. 3229 KBF, 2013 WL 2407172, at *1, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) (“Because 
the Dodd-Frank Act effectively reversed Morrison in the context of SEC enforcement actions, the 
primary holdings of this opinion affect only pre-Dodd Frank conduct.”); SEC v. Gruss, No. 11 
CIV. 2420, 2012 WL 3306166, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012) (“Section 929P(b) of the Dodd–
Frank Act allows the SEC to commence civil actions extraterritorially in certain cases.”); Asadi v. 
G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No. CIV.A. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 
2012) (“This conclusion against extraterritorial application is reinforced by Section 929P(b) of 
Dodd–Frank, which explicitly addresses extraterritorial scope of the statute in a limited context.”); In 
re Optimal U.S. Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (mentioning in dicta that 
“Congress has attempted to remedy that problem by restoring the conducts and effects test for SEC 
enforcement actions”); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“Congress explicitly granted federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction under the conduct or 
effect test for proceedings brought by the SEC . . . .”). 
 273 Traffic Monsoon, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1293–94 (“[T]he text of Section 929P(b), the legal 
context in which this amendment was drafted, legislative history, and the expressed purpose of the 
amendment all point to a congressional intent that, in actions brought by the SEC, Sections 10(b) 
and 17(a) should be applied to extraterritorial transactions to the extent that the conduct and ef-
fects test can be satisfied. The court concludes that these clear indications that Congress intended 
Sections 10(b) and 17(a) to be applied to foreign transactions are sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 274 Id. at 1304. 
 275 Id. at 1290–93. 
 276 Id. at 1291–92 (“It strains credulity to assume that legislators read Morrison on the last 
day that they met to negotiate the final version of a massive 850-page omnibus bill designed to 
overhaul large swaths of the United States financial regulations and consciously chose to enact 
Section 292P(b) against the background of the fundamental shift in securities law brought about 
 
2018] SEC & Foreign Private Issuers: Optimal Public Enforcement 2115 
These contextual and purposivist arguments may carry the day on ap-
peal. For one, as Posner and Gluck in their 2018 article conclude, federal 
appellate judges assign more value to legislative history and context than 
some textualist Justices on the Court may have wished.277 Moreover, the 
Court itself seems to be relaxing its narrow approach to statutory construc-
tion in the post-Scalia era. In Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, for exam-
ple, Justice Ginsburg consulted legislative history, which prompted two 
separate concurring opinions on the value of the statutory text, purpose, and 
history, filed by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, on 
the other hand, and Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joined, on 
the other.278 
Yet, despite the changes in statutory interpretation and contextual in-
quiries, it remains to be seen whether the Utah District Court’s decision in 
SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, will be affirmed by the Tenth Circuit and 
adopted by other courts and whether the ability of the SEC to prosecute se-
curities fraud under the more expansive conduct and effects tests will be 
explicitly and uniformly extended. As it stands now, the case law pendulum 
mainly swings between a doctrinal ambiguity and a pro-Commission posi-
tion. The practical outcomes of enforcement actions against foreign compa-
nies and their executives, therefore, may be mixed. Through this disparity, 
the legislature and the Supreme Court have complicated SEC’s assessments 
of its success rate in enforcement actions. 
When interdigitated with the arguments expounded in Part IV, this doc-
trinal uncertainty implies a collateral consequence—if the SEC has become 
less confident of scoring easy victories in enforcement actions involving 
foreign issuers and cross-border fraud, the Commission and its enforcement 
staff may be less willing to spend their resources in this area.279 As long as 
the ambiguity remains unsolved, Morrison may dampen the incentives of 
the SEC to engage in closer foreign issuer oversight, except, perhaps, publi-
cized instances of serious fraud implicating large numbers of American in-
vestors. 
Combining the conclusions of Parts III and IV, we are presented with a 
dilemma. On the one hand, the SEC may be expected to follow the same 
                                                                                                                           
by Morrison. Given this timing, the more reasonable assumption is that Morrison was issued too 
late in the legislative process to reasonably permit Congress to react to it.”). 
 277 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey 
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1300 (2018). 
 278 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). 
 279 In these circumstances, foreign issuers could rationally discount the probability of en-
forcement, while the SEC should overestimate the risk of failure in court, particularly in broader 
international schemes where fraudulent conduct or substantial harm to investors occurs in foreign 
countries. 
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safe route of low-key enforcement against foreign corporations. On the oth-
er hand, it is imprudent to completely ignore the recent “red flags” in for-
eign listings and changes in class action litigation, which may cause harm to 
American markets in the future. 
VI. POLICY PROPOSALS: PREVENTIVE MONITORING AND  
A SOFT ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
A. Low-Cost Low-Key Prevention 
This Part sketches a few policy options that the SEC could consider to 
fine-tune its policies in order to simultaneously avoid the lemons problem 
and the overdeterrence effect. Two factors bear on the proposals. First, the 
SEC’s enforcement approach is its dominant strategy within the existing 
ecology of enforcers. Its stance is also institutionally optimal, deeply en-
trenched, and based on the existing political and economic incentives to 
reduce investment in enforcement against foreign issuers. Second, there is a 
need to reconsider the current policy to tackle the red flags identified in this 
Article. Bearing these two considerations in mind, the Commission needs to 
devise low-cost measures that would allow it to internalize the costs and 
benefits of its policies and simultaneously navigate the cross-border en-
forcement realities and the interdependencies within the ecosystem of pri-
vate and public mechanisms.280 
To begin with, there is no need for the Commission to ramp up en-
forcement qua enforcement. It is not clear if international markets, as a 
global sui generis policy assessment mechanism, have penalized interna-
tional issuers for the Supreme Court decision. Researchers disagree whether 
stock returns, institutional investors’ portfolios, share prices, and liquidity 
of cross-listed shares have been affected by Morrison’s pruning of class 
actions.281 In a similar vein, the red flags identified in Part IV point toward 
future problems that may affect the market if the SEC stays on the same 
                                                                                                                           
 280 On the pros and cons of multi-enforcer systems, see generally Clopton, supra note 24, at 290, 
306–08 (suggesting that “redundant litigation may cure existing under-enforcement and deter future 
under-enforcement by allowing a second agent to fill the remedial gap” and reviewing germane de-
sign arguments); Engstrom, supra note 42, at 629, 656–75 (underscoring a need for coordination and 
interdependencies and discussing an ideal gatekeeper agency); Grundfest, supra note 162, 966–67, 
1022 (calling on the SEC to review the current public-private enforcement system). 
 281 Compare Bartlett, supra note 225 (concluding that market reaction was either positive or 
insignificant), and Licht et al. (same), supra note 84, at 25–26, with Gagnon & Karolyi, supra note 
172, at 147 (showing that Morrison “was associated with a large drop in the value premium cap-
tured by foreign firms whose shares were cross-listed on a U.S. exchange as well as with a statisti-
cally significant 37 basis point increase on the announcement day in the price deviation between 
the U.S. cross-listed shares trading in U.S. markets and the underlying home-market shares”).  
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course of low-key enforcement. If the resultant efficiency gains are uncer-
tain, stronger public enforcement should not automatically follow weakened 
class actions.282 The red flags instead warrant allocating more resources not 
toward enforcement actions per se but toward low-cost preventive measures 
and better “housekeeping.” 
Recall, for instance, that the Commission has been tardy in doing 
“housekeeping” and revoking registration of securities. With its current data 
analysis programs, however, the Commission should be able to generate 
better information and revoke registrations promptly. Already, in his 2015 
testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, Andrew 
Ceresney, Director of the Enforcement Division, stated that such enforce-
ment priorities as reporting and disclosure violations were supported by 
large-scale data analysis programs.283 These programs may be used to assist 
the Commission in routine “housekeeping” in foreign issuer reporting.284 
When it comes to potentially more serious violations, the SEC equally 
has the capacity to ensure better monitoring based on data analytics. The 
Division of Enforcement collaborates with the new Division of Economic 
and Risk Analysis (“DERA”) in developing methods “to detect anomalous 
financial results disclosed in public company filing data.”285 The Commis-
sion established DERA in 2009. Its functions include assisting in enforce-
ment and identifying market trends and risks.286 
The idea of using DERA more extensively in foreign issuer regulation 
comports with the overarching policies of the SEC. Michael Piwowar, for 
instance, urged in one of his speeches that “early DERA participation can 
                                                                                                                           
 282 For theories of optimal enforcement, see, for example, Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraak-
man, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 687, 752–54 (1997); Fox et al., supra note 161, at 371–76; Rose, supra note 86, at 255–
57; Stigler, supra note 161, at 531–34. 
 283 Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Testimony on “Oversight of the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement” (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/031915-test.
html [https://perma.cc/FB9G-G7WJ]. 
 284 Although revoking the registration of a security requires notice and a hearing (15 U.S.C. 
§ 78l(j) (2015)), this is a lower-cost procedure compared to investigations. In 2004, the SEC’s Divi-
sions of Enforcement and Corporation Finance established the Delinquent Filings Program. Continu-
ous investment in data analytics should further enhance the Divisions’ ability to identify delinquent 
filers promptly. For a basic description of the Program, see, for example U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, Delinquent Filings, Investor Bulletin, Nov. 1. 2013, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
ib_delinquent_filers.htm [https://perma.cc/JX7Q-89J9]. 
 285 Ceresney, supra note 283. The Enforcement Division also created the Financial Reporting 
and Audit Task Force to this purpose. Id.; see THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 13 (outlining the new analytical programs of the SEC); DERA—
Office of Corporate Finance, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/dera_ocf_page [https://perma.cc/
T675-9MNQ] (explaining the mission of the Office). 
 286 See DERA—Office of Corporate Finance, supra note 285. 
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help determine materiality, harm to investors (if any) . . . whether the bene-
fits of pursuing a particular enforcement action outweigh the costs, and 
whether it would be prudent to pursue alternative enforcement actions.”287 
As discussed in Part IV, institutional constraints and public choice argu-
ments suggest that the SEC may overestimate the costs of enforcement 
against foreign issuers and underestimate the benefits. Using DERA’s re-
sources as a primary screening mechanism would minimize those biases. 
In addition to DERA, the SEC has established, within its Enforcement 
Division, the Financial Reporting and Fraud Group with the purpose of not 
only identifying violations but also exploring areas “susceptible to fraudu-
lent financial reporting.”288 The SEC should extend these large-scale data 
analysis tools specifically to identify potentially fraudulent trends in foreign 
issuer reporting. 
Admittedly, identifying foreign firms’ accounting fraud through statis-
tical analysis may be difficult. Therefore, the key proposal is that the SEC 
staff does not need either to proceed with an investigation or recommend 
that the SEC take an enforcement action. Instead, the Commission may 
consider developing a new mechanism for preventive foreign issuer moni-
toring. The mechanism could be triggered by statistical aberrations and 
warning signs that should not necessarily fall within the definition of fraud 
under the securities laws. 
By way of example, DERA may run data analysis and alert either the 
Enforcement Division or the Division of Corporation Finance that a single 
firm or several foreign companies with certain characteristics exhibit report-
ing discrepancies and anomalies.289 After that, the Divisions, or one of 
them, may informally communicate to the potential subjects or, using the 
jargon of criminal enforcement, “targets” that they need to address the con-
cerns raised by DERA. 
The SEC does have a somewhat similar practice of sending cautionary 
letters to the subjects in cases that do not merit a full-scale investigation and 
                                                                                                                           
 287 Michael S. Piwowar, SEC Commissioner, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 
2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
022015-spchcmsp.html#.VOyC1iyfarg [https://perma.cc/GA8D-J5CB]. 
 288 Financial Reporting and Audit (FRAud) Group, SEC , https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
financial-reporting-and-audit-task-force.shtml [https://perma.cc/TFX8-2DUF]. 
 289 The need for more economic analysis and using DERA in SEC rulemaking and enforce-
ment has already been explored in the literature. See, e.g., Jerry Ellig & Hester Peirce, SEC Regu-
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issuer enforcement. 
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comment letters requesting reporting companies to provide additional in-
formation to the SEC.290 In contrast to the mechanism I am suggesting here, 
the Commission does not issue the cautionary letters often and makes 
comment letters publicly available on its webpage. Under my proposal, 
however, DERA-generated letters should be routine, nonpublic, and not 
related to a formal or informal investigation. 
First, consider the costs. Once the practice of informal requests be-
comes standardized and routine, economies of scale should reduce the 
SEC’s costs per issuer. Second, these actions would not reach the level of a 
“matter under investigation.” Instead, the SEC would be reacting to anoma-
lies in the data. Third, as opposed to comment letters, there would be no 
need for multiple rounds of letters from the Division of Corporation Fi-
nance and responses from reporting issuers. The primary objective of this 
light-touch approach is eliciting cooperation and improvements in issuers’ 
corporate governance, transparency, and/or internal controls. A collateral 
benefit, self-evidently, would be the additional information about the regis-
trants, which could be used in the future to identify serious violations and 
bring enforcement actions. 
Here is how it may work: A firm could have the right to choose to ei-
ther respond to the informal request from the Commission or modify its 
reporting and corporate policies without responding to the SEC letter. In the 
latter case, the firm would have an option to file either a current report by 
furnishing Form 6-K;291 its next annual report if it was due within less than, 
for instance, three months from the date of the request; or a report with a 
foreign regulator and/or exchange. Another alternative could be to publish a 
notice about relevant corporate governance or reporting improvements on 
the firm’s webpage in English. The management’s incentives to comply 
                                                                                                                           
 290 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 835 
(James D. Cox et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013) (describing cautionary letters); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of the Division of Corporation Finance’s Disclosure Review 
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 291 SEC, Form 6-K (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/form6-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/24FV-
Q6AT]. 
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would be strengthened by the nonpublic nature of the SEC’s actions. The 
firm would publicize its initiatives and signal corporate improvements as if 
they were “sua sponte” actions. Even though the role of DERA and the SEC 
would remain nonpublic, the resultant improvements in governance or 
transparency should accrue to the benefit of the investors. 
As a way to promote compliance, the informal SEC letters could ex-
plicitly stipulate two courses of action. First, the Commission could threat-
en retaliation. Unless a firm explained its reporting choices or changed its 
policies as described above, the Division of Corporation Finance would 
send a comment letter, which would later on become public. In more serious 
cases, the Enforcement Division would either commence an investigation or 
refer the matter to the firm’s primary regulator abroad. In essence, under 
this mechanism, the Commission would be blowing the whistle either by 
prompting the firms to run internal investigations and ensure proper report-
ing and internal controls292 or by referring the anomaly to foreign enforcers. 
The latter option would also remove these items from the SEC enforcement 
agenda and balance sheet. 
The Commission may also seamlessly combine the suggested low-cost 
measures with the tried-and-tested techniques, such as reports under Section 
21(a) of the Exchange Act.293 Should it be necessary to give publicity to the 
DERA requests and ensuing investigation, the SEC could publish the report 
and, if necessary, permit the foreign firm to file a statement in writing ex-
plaining its version of the events.294 
Second, the SEC might also spell out that it reserved the option not to 
retaliate, without providing an explanation to the target. In other words, it 
could openly exercise discretionary nonenforcement. As the firm would not 
know upfront which action the SEC might choose, its management would 
be incentivized to cooperate and undertake compliance measures or, in the 
alternative, to prepare for an action. 
To be effective, this approach requires the following commitment from 
the SEC: a firm that tries to cooperate and improve should not be prosecut-
ed unless the Commission determines that the violations are egregious and 
that public policy and investor protection objectives militate against discre-
                                                                                                                           
 292 The suggested process is somewhat similar to no-action letters, which currently seem to 
have become a less acceptable solution than in the past. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 15. 
 293 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2015). The reports have traditionally served as a publicity device 
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conduct.” SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 116, at 720. 
 294 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a). 
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tionary nonprosecution.295 Cooperation is already a prominent mechanism 
welcomed by the Commission and embedded, inter alia, in its Enforcement 
Cooperation Program, the 2010 Policy Statement, and its revised Enforce-
ment Manual.296 Moreover, there is room for significant enforcement flexi-
bility. The Manual itself acknowledges that “[s]ince every enforcement mat-
ter is unique, the appropriate use of a cooperation tool invariably depends 
upon a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case.”297 In 
the informal system that I propose here, the cooperation takes place earlier, 
before an investigation and at a lower cost. 
The justification of this light-touch approach lies not only in the pure 
costs of enforcement, but also in general economic arguments. It is com-
monly understood that the primary objective of enforcement actions is de-
terrence.298 As discussed, the adjacent goals are market efficiency entwined 
with controlling the risk of overdeterrence. In international issuer regula-
tion, this is not merely a theoretical concept but a measurable phenomenon 
that may entail an unnecessary outflow of issuers from the United States.299 
The mechanism suggested above is a cost-efficient way of fostering cooper-
ation while keeping the overdeterrence concerns in check. 
The nature of cross-listings and the bonding theory outlined in Part III 
also suggest that companies choosing to heed the warnings will be self-
identifying as “oranges,” whereas firms ignoring the SEC will default to the 
“lemons” category. There will be a clear separating equilibrium, which will 
help the SEC identify and, if necessary, proceed against certain issuers. If a 
firm remains interested in listing on U.S. exchanges, it will reaffirm its 
“bond” to American law and market institutions and cooperate with the 
SEC early on, particularly if the publicity, costs, and risks of doing so are 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Presumably, “an enforcer can help reduce this risk of overdeterrence by signaling to firms 
that they will escape liability for their agents’ frauds if they can demonstrate that they took effi-
cient precautions.” Rose, supra note 24, at 2202. 
 296 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 117, § 6.2; Enforcement Cooperation Program, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enforcement-cooperation-initiative.shtml [https://perma.cc/9BV7-
HSUP]; Policy Statement Concerning Cooperation by Individuals in Its Investigations and Related 
Enforcement Actions, Release No. 34-61340, at 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/
2010/34-61340.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH83-HDUP]. 
 297 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 117, § 6.2. 
 298 See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (underscoring the differences 
between SEC actions and claims of individual investors and emphasizing that “[t]he theory behind 
the remedy is deterrence and not compensation”); ABA Section on Business Law, Report of The 
Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1092 (1992) (mentioning that “the agency’s 
position reflects a strong public interest dimension” and that the SEC “may feel compelled to 
impose a harsh sanction and, moreover, to ‘send a message’ to industry participants”). 
 299 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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low.300 Put differently, informing foreign issuers early about possible inves-
tigations and negative publicity should help the SEC identify international 
companies that value their cross-listings programs and allow those compa-
nies take corrective measures preempting enforcement and publicity. 
B. Killing Two Birds with “Low-Cost Stones” 
My second proposed policy adjustment is firmly rooted in the reality 
that the SEC relies on private enforcers, that both have been ineluctable liti-
gation companions, and that the market reacts strongly to a combination of 
private and public actions. If, in the post-Morrison world, the SEC would 
like to continue to rely on private enforcers, it must take notice of the ongo-
ing procedural developments. One specific initiative could be helping both 
the market and the plaintiffs’ bar identify potentially meritorious violations 
by publishing some results of DERA economic analysis on market trends 
and providing it to the public at large. 
DERA itself does not have the authority to frame SEC enforcement 
priorities.301 Publishing its data analysis and reporting on market trends may 
represent another soft method for increasing deterrence without actual pub-
lic enforcement. DERA has a separate Office of Corporate Finance, which 
examines reporting issuers’ filings, public offerings, and unregistered offer-
ings.302 The Commission would kill two birds with one stone by adding a 
new project line to the already existing review of filings and selectively 
publishing results.303 
This informational input should alert the market that something is 
amiss and galvanize such “gatekeepers” as market analysts and institutional 
investors. Research suggests that the extent and accuracy of analyst cover-
age, for instance, is correlated not only with cross-listing in a foreign juris-
diction,304 but also with the enforcement environment.305 As an enforcement 
                                                                                                                           
 300 Adverse publicity is costly. It may snowball and produce both financial and non-financial 
negative consequences. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICI-
TY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 227–45 (1983). On the relevant reputational penalties associated 
with public enforcement, see, for example, Karpoff et al., supra note 160. 
 301 See, e.g., Verret, supra note 289, at 495 (“The SEC Enforcement Division currently uses 
DERA to effectively provide litigation support after a case has been brought, or utilizes DERA to 
provide expert guidance during an investigation, but DERA has no authority to participate in the 
decision to bring an investigation or action nor to set the ground rules for how the SEC Enforce-
ment Division prioritizes its caseload or determines penalties and settlements.”). 
 302 See DERA—Office of Corporate Finance, supra note 285. 
 303 The Commission, obviously, does not need to disclose its enforcement techniques. 
 304 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 223, at 505–08 (2002); Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Ana-
lysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Envi-
ronment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317, 318 (2003). 
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agency charged with the dual task of protecting investors and promoting 
market efficiency, through these measures the SEC will equip institutional 
“gatekeepers” with additional informational tools. 
A subsequent downward price adjustment may, as it typically does, 
draw the attention of another group of gatekeepers—the plaintiffs’ bar—and 
prompt a review of filings in search of actionable violations. Enabling the 
plaintiffs to better monitor foreign issuers should benefit the Commission 
by promoting the equilibrium where the plaintiffs’ bar and the SEC each 
take the lead in different enforcement segments. Morrison will allay the 
germane concerns about frivolous litigation and overenforcement, serve as a 
sentry, watching for the excesses in the extraterritorial application of the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws, and subdue attorneys’ animal 
spirits actuating strike suits. By the same token, the suggested approach 
should alleviate the inefficiencies associated with copycat cases where pri-
vate attorneys freeride off of SEC efforts and turn class actions into ineffi-
cient bounty-hunter enforcement.306 Instead, private attorneys would lead 
off and invest resources in investigating potential violations whereas the 
SEC would merely provide “data pointers.” 
To conclude, a soft approach is rational and feasible. The SEC has in-
timated that its enforcement guideposts are efficiency and net benefits from 
enforcement, evaluated against the costs to the market, the SEC, corpora-
tions, and investors.307 If so, the Commission should openly acknowledge 
its traditional low-key enforcement against foreign corporations and set 
forth the metes and bounds of an efficacious preventive approach. 
                                                                                                                           
 305 See Alexander Kerl & Martin Ohlert, Star-Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and the Role of 
Corporate Governance 19–20, 28–29 (Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195909 [https://perma.cc/ML92-8Y22]. 
 306 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 52, at 1345, 1362 (“‘[C]opycat’ class actions often are not 
amenable to dismissal at the pleadings stage—even if it appears that the damages claimed will, at 
the end of the day, be fully offset by a Fair Funds distribution.”). 
 307 In 2006, for instance, the Commission issued a statement concerning financial penalties and 
prioritized the universal tenet that it was “important to provide the maximum possible degree of clari-
ty, consistency, and predictability in explaining the way that its corporate penalty authority will be 
exercised.” Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, 
SEC (Jan. 4, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [https://perma.cc/5RP4-LRTP]. 
Unfortunately, it is possible that the staff recommends actions without assessing such 2006 factors 
as “a direct benefit to the corporation” and compensation of “harm to the injured shareholders.” 
Piwowar, supra note 287; see Rose, supra note 24, at 2184–85; Rose, supra note 86, at 255 (“The 
goal of a securities-fraud deterrence regime should be to minimize the sum of the costs that securi-
ties fraud produces and the costs that the deterrence regime itself produces.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article is not a call to arms. At the same time, the SEC needs to 
react to the recent changes in class action litigation against foreign issuers, a 
possible lemons problem, and the potential risk of underenforcement. As 
this analysis demonstrates, the Commission cannot produce a national sys-
tem of optimal enforcement that would minimize the social costs of foreign 
issuer fraud without cooperation from the plaintiffs’ bar, the market, and the 
regulators in various foreign jurisdictions. Through traditional enforcement, 
the SEC would be pursuing an insurmountable task of designing a national 
“Pigouvian tax”308 on fraud committed by international corporations operat-
ing in multiple jurisdictions. Through nonenforcement, it could miss the 
signs of a lemons market.  
A logical alternative is that the SEC may start with sending an explicit 
signal to the market that the Commission is designing more efficient low-
cost options and preventive monitoring policies. The solutions suggested in 
this Article focus on better cooperation with foreign firms and the SEC’s 
recently improved capacity to analyze “big data” to identify anomalies in 
reporting. The proposed low-cost procedures should help the SEC engage 
market gatekeepers and private attorneys, achieve a more optimal level of 
deterrence without bringing costly enforcement actions, and simultaneously 
send a strong signal to international “lemons.” 
                                                                                                                           
 308 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 93, 95 (2015) (“A Pigouvian tax is a tax equal to the harm that the firm imposes on third 
parties.”). 
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Appendix I: Foreign Private Issuers in SEC Enforcement Actions 
(2005–2016) 
Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2005 Azteca Holdings, S.A. de C.V. X X X 
2005 ING Groep N.V. 
2005 TV Azteca, S.A. de C.V. X X X 
2006 Bennett Environmen-tal Inc. X X  
2006 Grupo Elektra S.A. X 
2006 Grupo Iusacell, S.A. de C.V. X  
2006 Healthtrac, Inc. X 
2006 Lumenis Ltd. X 
2006 Lumenis Ltd. X X X 
2006 Netease.com Inc. X X 
2006 Olicom A/S X 
2006 Seven Seas Petroleum Inc.  X  
2006 Statoil ASA X 
2006 TV Azteca, S.A. de C.V. X  
2007 Akzo Nobel N.V. X 
2007 Barclays Bank PLC X 
2007 Getgomail.Com, Inc. (n/k/a/ Getgo, Inc.)  X  
2007 Nortel Networks Corp. X X X 
2007 Nortel Networks Ltd. X X X 
2008 Benguet X 
2008 Biovail Corporation X X X 
2008 CNH Global N.V. X 
2008 Converium Holding AG X X X 
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2008 Fiat S.p.A. X 
2008 Hollinger Inc. X 
2008 Realax Software AG X 
2008 Siemens Aktiengesell-schaft X 
2009 Novo Nordisk A/S X 
2010 ABB Ltd. X 
2010 Alcatel-Lucent For-eign Parent  X 
2010 
Anderson Energy Ltd 
(p/k/a Aquest Minerals 
Corp.)  
X  
2010 Aspen Group Re-sources Corp. X  
2010 China Technology Global Corp. X  
2010 China Yuchai Interna-tional Ltd.  X X 
2010 Crystal Graphite Corp. X 
2010 ENI S.p.A. X 
2010 Gee-Ten Ventures Inc. X 
2010 Royal Dutch Shell plc X 
2010 Shep Technologies Inc.  X  
2010 Silvercrest Mines Inc. X 
2010 Technip X 
2010 Technoprises Ltd. X 
2011 Austral Pacific Energy Ltd. X  
2011 Buffalo Gold Ltd. X 
2011 Calais Resources Inc. X 
2011 Deutsche Telekom AG X 
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2011 Diageo plc X 
2011 Global Mainframe Corp.  X  
2011 GSI Group Inc. X X 
2011 Longtop Financial Technologies X  
2011 M(2003) plc X 
2011 Magyar Telekom X 
2011 
Mercator Minerals 
Ltd. (f/k/a Silver Eagle 
Resources Ltd)  
X  
2011 Si Mei Te Food Ltd. X 
2012 Allianz SE X 
2012 AMS Homecare Inc. X 
2012 A-Power Energy Gen-eration Systems, Ltd. X  
2012 Biotech Holdings Ltd. X 
2012 Blue Earth Refineries Inc.  X  
2012 BP plc X X 
2012 Central Minera Corp. X 
2012 
China Agro-
Technology Holdings 
Ltd.  
X  
2012 China Medical Tech-nologies, Inc. X  
2012 Pine Valley Mining Corp.  X  
2012 
Qiao Xing Mobile 
Communication Co. 
Ltd.  
X  
2012 Qiao Xing Universal Resources, Inc.  X  
2012 Robomatix Technolo-gies Ltd.   
2012 Silvermex Resources Inc. X  
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2012 Smith & Nephew plc X 
2012 TTC Technology Corp.  X  
2013 BBV Vietnam S.E.A. Acquisition Corp. X  
2013 Birch Mountain Re-sources Ltd.  X  
2013 Capital Reserve Cana-da Ltd.  X  
2013 Carbiz Inc. X 
2013 China Cablecom Holdings, Ltd. X  
2013 CNC Development Ltd.  X  
2013 Crystallex Internation-al Corp.  X  
2013 Dynasty Gaming Inc. X 
2013 e-Sim Ltd. X 
2013 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.  X 
2013 Soil Biogenics Ltd. X 
2013 Total S.A. X 
2014 Asia Growth Private Equity 1, Ltd. X  
2014 Asia Growth Private Equity 2, Ltd. X  
2014 Asia Growth Private Equity 3, Ltd.  X  
2014 Asia Private Equity SPAC 1, Ltd. X  
2014 Asia Private Equity SPAC 2, Ltd. X  
2014 Asia Private Equity SPAC 3, Ltd.  X  
2014 Balaton Power Inc. X 
2014 Canadian Solar Inc. X X 
2014 Carthew Bay Tech-nologies Inc. X  
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2014 China Oumei Real Estate Inc.  X  
2014 Cougar Oil & Gas Canada Inc. X  
2014 Current Technology Corp. X  
2014 Flint Int'l Services, Inc.   
2014 Gamecorp Ltd. X 
2014 Globetech Ventures Corp. X  
2014 Green Asia Resources Inc. X  
2014 Homeland Precious Metals Corp.  X  
2014 Lions Gate Entertain-ment Corp. X  
2014 Panoshan Marketing Corp. X  
2014 Rosedale Decorative Products Ltd.   
2014 Royal Bank of Scot-land Group plc   
2014 Sino Oil & Gas Pipe Holdings Ltd. X  
2014 Sungold International Holdings Corp.  X  
2014 Ungava Mines Inc. X 
2014 World Ventures Inc. X 
2015 ASAT Holdings Ltd. X 
2015 Beyond Golden Hold-ings Ltd. X  
2015 BHP Billiton plc X 
2015 CityView Corp Ltd. X 
2015 Dittybase Technolo-gies Inc. X  
2015 DJSP Enterprises, Inc. X X 
2015 First Potash Corp. X 
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2015 HIP Energy Corp. X 
2015 Hitachi Ltd. X 
2015 International Hi Tech Industries Inc.  X  
2015 Jet Cheer Investments Ltd.  X  
2015 Mark One Global In-dustries, Inc.  X  
2015 Nortel Networks Corp. X 
2015 
Oriental Nonferrous 
Metals Technology Co., 
Ltd.  
X  
2015 Petro Horizon Energy Corp.  X  
2015 Polyair Inter Pack Inc. 
2015 QSound Labs Inc. X 
2015 Silverado Gold Mines Ltd.  X  
2015 Storm Cat Energy Corp. X 
2015 World Gaming plc X 
2016 Braskem S.A. X 
2016 China Heli Resource Renewable Inc.  X  
2016 Coastal Pacific Mining Corp. X  
2016 Credit Suisse AG X X X 
2016 
Dragon Bright Mintai 
Botanical Technology 
Ltd.  
X  
2016 Easy Health Technolo-gies Ltd.  X  
2016 Embraer S.A. X 
2016 Galileo Petroleum Ltd. X 
2016 Giant Resources Inc. X 
2016 Great Basin Gold Ltd. X 
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Year 
Initial 
Action 
Filed 
Company §§ 10 (b) & 17 §13(a) §13(b)(2) & (5) 
2016 
LATAM Airlines 
Group S.A. (f/n/a 
LAN Airlines S.A.)   
X 
2016 Logitech International S.A. X X X 
2016 Macau Resources Group Ltd.  X  
2016 Metal Storm Ltd. X 
2016 New World Batteries, Inc. X  
2016 Nordion Inc. X 
2016 Northcore Technolo-gies Inc.  X  
2016 
Northern Canadian 
Minerals Inc. (n/k/a 
Northern Canadian 
Uranium Inc.) 
 X  
2016 Novartis AG X 
2016 Petaquilla Minerals Ltd.  X  
2016 
Pharol, Sgps, S.A. 
(f/k/a Portugal Tele-
com, Sgps, S.A., )  
X X 
2016 Rush Exploration Inc. X 
2016 SAP SE X 
2016 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.  X 
2132 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2055 
Appendix II: Default Judgments and Similar Case Outcomes 
(Post-Morrison Filing Dates) 
Case Docket 
Number 
Order Date Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse Links (Includ-
ing Links to Related Cases) 
In re China Medi-
aExpress Holdings, 
Inc. Shareholder 
Litigation 
1:11-cv-
00804-
VM-
GWG 
Default Judgment 
against Defendant 
China MediaExpress 
Holdings, Inc. Pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
55(B)(2) And Local 
Civil Rule 55.2 
01/17/14 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104637 
[https://perma.cc/QA8L-QPJF] 
Dan Katz v. China 
Century Dragon 
Media, Inc. et al. 
2:11-cv-
02769-
JAK-SS 
Default Judgment 11/19/15 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104673 
[https://perma.cc/2H2Y-HTQ5] 
In re China Intelli-
gent Lighting and 
Electronics, Inc. 
2:11-cv-
02768-
PSG-SS 
Order for Entry of 
Judgment by Default 
against Defendant 
China Intelligent Light-
ing and Electronics, Inc. 
09/18/14 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104678 
[https://perma.cc/WPT7-VHN4] 
In re Puda Coal 
Securities Inc., et 
al. Litigation 
1:11-cv-
02598-
DLC-
HBP 
Order Entering Default 
Judgment 
05/10/17 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104686 
[https://perma.cc/QN7V-ATR8] 
Tak Hiromoto et al. 
v. Subaye Inc et al. 
2:11-cv-
07168-
SVW-
PLA 
In Chambers Order 
Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Plain-
tiff’s Application for 
Default Judgment 
12/15/14  
In re Subaye, Inc. 
Securities Litigation 
11-CV-
02614 
(NRB) 
Order  
*Plaintiff was unable to 
locate any books, as-
sets, or Subaye’s prin-
cipals. 
12/01/11 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104687 
[https://perma.cc/2BCM-82DW] 
In re Longtop 
Financial Technol-
ogies Limited 
Securities Litigation 
1:11-cv-
03658-
VEC 
Order Entering Default 
Judgment 
11/14/13 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104712 
[https://perma.cc/G45P-NSDZ] 
In re Jiangbo Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 
Securities Litigation 
1:11-cv-
22556-
MGC 
Order Staying Case as 
to Defendant Jiangbo 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
upon Suggestion of 
Bankruptcy 
05/29/13 
 
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104745 
[https://perma.cc/FVS5-CJR8] 
Brandon Muham-
mad v. China Sky 
One Medical Inc. et 
al. 
2:12-cv-
02552-
DMG-
CW 
Order re Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Entry of 
Default Judgment and 
Motion for Class Certi-
fication 
* China Sky neither 
07/14/14 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104867 
[https://perma.cc/MM8R-ME6D] 
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Case Docket 
Number 
Order Date Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse Links (Includ-
ing Links to Related Cases) 
appeared nor opposed 
the pending motions. 
The motion for default 
judgment was denied. 
Akhmatov v. China 
Sky One Medical, 
Inc. et al. 
1:12-cv-
01418-
PAC 
Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal without 
Prejudice Pursuant To 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(A)(1)(A) 
* No defendant has 
filed an answer or a 
motion to dismiss. 
05/04/12 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104867 
[https://perma.cc/5KP6-HCMK] 
Fayun Luo v. Qiao 
Xing Universal 
Resources et al. 
 
1:12-cv-
00045-
AET-
GWC 
Order 05/01/18 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104888 
[https://perma.cc/4YLA-EMUH] 
In re Chinacast 
Education Corpora-
tion Securities 
Litigation 
CV 12-
4621-
JFW 
Order Granting Plain-
tiff’s Motion for Entry 
of Default Judgment 
against Defendant 
Chinacast Education 
Corporation 
11/8/16 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104902 
[https://perma.cc/66QH-PMJ4] 
Dartell v. Tibet 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. et al. 
 
2:14-cv-
03620-
JMV-
JBC 
Clerk's Entry of Default 
as to Defendant, Tibet 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
07/28/16 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104904 
[https://perma.cc/6TQL-HFNQ] 
Ghodooshim Et Al. 
V. Wu Et Al. 
(Issuer Defendant: 
Qiao Xing Mobile 
Communication 
Company, Ltd.) 
1:12-cv-
09264-
GHW 
Order for Class Certifi-
cation and Default 
Judgment 
05/24/13 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104989 
[https://perma.cc/X56W-TTBX] 
In re Longwei 
Petroleum Invest-
ment Limited 
Securities Litigation 
1:13-cv-
00214-
RMB-
RLE 
Default Judgment as to 
Liability against Long-
wei Petroleum Invest-
ment Holding Limited 
and Dora Dong 
12/19/13 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
case.html?id=104997 
[https://perma.cc/23T4-5DV8] 
  
 
